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CHAIRMAN ALISTER McALISTER:

Good morning.

The interim

committee meeting of the Finance and Insurance Committee will come
to order.

During the last legislative session there were numerous

bills introduced to modify the existing law that applies to
California real property transactionso

Some of these bills were

successful but probably the majority of those bills proposed were
not successful and there are many critical issues that remain unresolved and this, of course, coupled with the inflation and high
interest rates creates or has given rise to many problems that
confront our society.
Originally there were two and then four bills that
provided the main thrust for the statewide hearings on the real
property finance conducted by this Committee.

Senator Gregorio's

SB 200 would have enacted restrictions on the use of the due-onsale clause, as well as restrictions on prepayment penalties.
Senator Carpenter's SB 1244 proposed a different formula for
limiting prepayment penalties.

Assemblyman Hayden's AB 2114, as

amended in the Senate, would have enacted the same provisions in
regard to prepayment penalties as SB 200, and would have slightly
restricted use of the due-on-sale clause.

Finally, Assemblyman

Deddeh's AB 105 would have placed statutory limitations on the
amount of the late charges which may be assessed on installment
loans on single-family, owner-occupied dwellings.
four bills, however, was enacted.

None of these

The Committee, at the request of many persons and after
the original dates were set, agreed to expand the subject matter
of the hearings beyond the question of prepayment penalties and the
due-on-sale clause and late charges to cover the entire area of
real estate transactional costs.

We expect public testimony on

many topics including such important topics as interest rates and
the usury law, real estate brokerage commissions, finder's fees,
appraisal fees, escrow charges, title insurance costs, "points",
and other loan fees, loan assumption charges, and other important
issues.
Before we commence, I would like to introduce Assemblyman Hayden, who is with me today, and I'm sure there will be other
members of the Committee who will come along.

Chief Counsel

carlyle Brakensiek is sitting immediately to my right and to my
left and your right is the Committee Secretary Betty Yearwood and
my Administrative Assistant Sal Bianco.
Our first witness today will be

Mr.

Sean McCarthy from

the California Land Title Association.
MR. SEAN McCARTHY:

Mr.

Chairman and members of the

Committee, I'm Sean McCarthy, Vice President and Legislative Counsel
of the california Land Title Association.
that capacity.

I appear here today in

The CLTA is a trade association comprised of all

title insurers licensed and actively conducting the business of
title insurance in this state.

The Association is in the final

stages of preparation of a formal statement which, with the permission of the Chairman, we would request incorporating into the
record upon my submission of that report.
- 2 -

0
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:
0

MR. McCARTHY:

Very good.

In my formal testimony today, I would

like to highlight some of the information contained in this formal
statement in which the CLTA has attempted to anticipate and answer

0

a number of questions about the title industry which have been
raised in other forums and in the press.

I will also attempt to

respond to any questions which the members of this Committee might
direct.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, as you are

all well aware, the subject of these hearings involves issues that
are both broad and complex, encompassing all costs associated with
the consummation and financing of real property transactions.

The

CI·TA perceives that a thorough study of these issues will necessarily direct the Committee's inquiry into many of the same areas
already studied at the federal level in the course of the past five
years.

Although, of course, the thrust of this Committee's efforts

will be to define and identify California problems and develop
solutions for california problems, not federal problems, the definitional framework adopted and used at the federal level in their
investigation of costs associated with the acquisition and financing
of real property is directly applicable to this committee's investigation.

We respectfully suggest that your difficult task might be

advanced substantially if you were to employ this definitional
framework during the course of your hearings and to aid the Committee's perspective on the various components of real estate
settlement costs in California.
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The subject of inquiry at the federal level has been
what are termed mortgage settlement costs.

The most thorough and

comprehensive study of such costs is contained in a document entitled "Report on Mortgage Settlement costs", published jointly by
the

u. s.

Department of Housing and urban Development and the

Veterans Administration in January, 1972, and commonly referred to
as the HUD-v.A Report.

The data for the study were taken from over

50,000 FHA and VA transactions during the month of March, 1971.
While we realize that one must go carefully about drawing conclusions from data now almost four years old, the definitional framework and the empirical data in which the HUD-VA Report combine to
provide a useful tool in pinpointing the components of settlement
costs and for understanding the relative importance of each of
these components in the consummation and financing of real property
transactions.
One further caveat regarding the HUD-v.A Report, some,
including members of the title industry, have criticized the
methodology applied by HUD-VA in reaching certain conclusions in
their report.

We of CLTA do not suggest that all of the report's

findings and conclusions are warranted.

We commend the report to

this Committee solely on the basis of a definitional framework
adopted by the federal agencies in their studies and also the basic
empirical data upon which their report was based.
The HUD-VA definitional framework involves three
fundamental concepts:
related costs.

closing costs, settlement costs, and title-

It is extremely important to this conceptual

framework to note that the all-inclusive term is settlement costs;
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0

that is, settlement costs include closing costs and, in turn,

0

includes title-related costs.
In order to facilitate your understanding of this
framework we have prepared this chart which is a compilation of all

0

California data that was used in the HUD-VA report of all cases
studied.

Now, on this chart, I have shown how, according to the

HUD-VA approach, these three fundamental concepts relate to one

0

another.

The largest bracket on the right indicates the concept

of settlement costs including all 16 components of costs associated
with the conveyance of real property.
And the next multibracket indicates the closing cost
which includes, in turn, title-related costs.
Now, within the segments of the bar, we have listed
components of the studies of the HUD-VA, thereby aggregating all
16 of these cost components which are able to come up with the
composite term settlement costs.
Now, as I noted earlier, this bar is constructed for
what was termed the average transaction representing all california
cases, which HUD-VA collected in March, 1971.
California transaction, the

For that average

- ----- -.
total settlement costs amounted to

10.89

percent of the sales price of the homeo
Mr .

.

Chairman, by any test, .1 0.89 percent of
'

.

sal~s

price is a substantial sum of money and a significant economic
barrier to home ownership.

We, in the title industry, recognize

and are concerned about any factors that discourage home ownership.
We, therefore, deeply share your concern over the extent to which
settlement costs may operate to inhibit or completely frustrate
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the desire of consumers to achieve home ownership.
man, we are likewise concerned

But, Mro Chair-

over the apparent misunderstandings

that have arisen regarding the extent of the title insurance industry's contributions to the high cost of home acquisition.
been

sugg~~t~d

----···

It has

---~---·~----

that the title industry is one of the major contrib-

uting factors to high settlement costs in california.

An analysis

of the various components of settlement costs in California will
demonstrate that this allegation is simply not true.
If I may refer your attention back to the chart, you
can see that loBS percent of the sales price has been allocated to
the so-called title-related costs. You will also see that this
- - --- . ·- .. - ..... ..
category of settlement costs is comprised of six distinct
componentso
.
.
.
These are " title examination, title insurance, escrow fees, closing
fees, document preparation, and a catch-all category "other closing
costs".
Mr. Chairman, in those cases where the title industry
does not, and I emphasize does not, perform the escrow or closing
functions, the only two components of title-related costs, indeed
of entire settlement costs, in which the title industry is involved,
are title examination and title insurance.

And, according to the

data in the HUD-VA Report, the total cost of title examination and
title insurance for the average California transaction amounted to
$165, or .074% out of the total of

10o8~~

for settlement costso

Moreover, of that $165, approximately $30 to $35 is for title insurance
associated
with
special coverage requirements of
·_
__ -·-costs
......
-.
the lending industry and, while necessary though, they may be they
- ~.
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nevertheless operate to increase the cost to the horne purchaser-

0

borrower.
Looking at that same average california transaction in

0

another way, on a horne that sold in March of 1971 for $22,000,
,...---····· -· -···-··-· --·- --·. -- - -· . . -· ··
total settlement costs were $2,420o The real estate commission,
discount points and prepaid items accounted for $1,743 or 7.80% of
the sales price.

Another $273 or 1.23% went for survey fees,

credit reports, termite inspection, HUD-VA appraisal fees, recording fees, and state and local transfer taxes.

The fee for escrow

services, closing fee , document preparation charge and other closing costs
sales price.

Category D here -- amounted to $239 or 1.11% of the
Title insurance and title examination combined
r-----·-· -----

~····

..

-

..

-

amounted to $165 or 0.74% of the sales price.
As I stressed earlier, Mr. Chairman, the foregoing
breakdown depicting the title industry's relatively small contri·bution to settlement costs was predicated on the assumption of no
industry involvement in the escrow or closing function.
I would now like to address my remarks to the industry's
role in total settlement costs where these services are performed
by a member of our industry.
The HUD-VA Report refers to a sub-study of titlerelated costs in 12 major metropolitan areas in the United
using the same March, 1971 data.
those 12 areas.

States~

Los Angeles County was one of

It is probably an understatement to say that the

report is highly critical of many Los Angeles practices brought to
light in this sub-study.

We would now like to demonstrate that
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these criticisms should be directed to industries other than the
title industry.
At the outset it should be noted that it is difficult
to compare all the Los Angeles data with the statewide data for
California because the report does not give the same detailed
statistical breakdown of the statewide data on title-related cost
components as it does for the Los Angeles sub-studyo

With this

caveat, I refer your attention to Chart 2, which schematically
illustrates the Los Angeles problem.
On this chart, the center bar represents the same 1.85%
and was derived from the average california transaction analysis.
Bear in mind, this chart depicts only title-related costs, or 1.85%
of total settlement costs amounting to

10o8~~

of sales price.

In

the center bar, we have shown the $165 or 0.74% for title insurance
out of the total title-related costs of $404 for the average
california transaction.
Now, the bar on the left depicts the Los Angeles substudy.

Total title-related costs in Los Angeles were found to be

$436 or

2.1~~

of the selling price.

Breaking this sum into its component parts the report
indicates the cost of title insurance and title examination was
$165 -- the same amount as in the statewide averageo

However, the

other title-related costs, one or more of the remaining cost components in combination result in a much higher cost to the consumer
than in the statewide sample.

Escrow fees are $148 and document

preparation fees, $14, and in the catch all category and other

- 8 -

0

c.t_osi!!9

0

cos~~-q.mQl.J.Il:ting__i;;Q ___ ~-~9~0

It is these cost components that

make up the $271 difference between total title-related costs in
the Los Angeles sub-study of $436 and the $165 for title insurance.
As was pointedout earlier, there is no detailed break-

0

down for other components -- for these other components on a statewide basis and it is therefore difficult to accurately depict their
relative role in the center barD

But one thing is quite clear, one

or more of these costs would have to be lower in order to come
within the statewide average .
There is information i n the HUD-VA Report in direct
support of the propositi on t hat title-related costs in certain
other areas of California approach the relatively high level of
the Los Angeles pattern if indeed they do not duplicate it.

And
-~ -

·---

there is still also other data to indicate in other areas of
calirornia._the
cos_'t:._~- - -~ -~-- -~a;r

~~~~~~~-®.

too high.

eyerag.e .of $404 or 1.85% for title"':'related
The bar on the right represents schematically

all those other areas of california where title-related costs are
lower.

Mr. Chairman, it is common knowledge, and borne out
by the rate-filings of the California title industry -- which are
a matter of public record on file in the Department of Insurance --

-- ··----· . . . . --..--.. ·-6 __,... .,.. _.,..__, _. ..._, . . .. . ...- . .·.
~

~·-------

. .·-··-··---·-----... ................... ·-

that when the escrow or closing function in a real estate settlement
is performed by the title

industry~

these remaining cost components

of title-related costs, other than title insurance and title examination would have been far less in 1971 than the $271 they cost in
Los Angeles, and also far less than the $239 they cost in the statewide average transaction.

This fact is still true todayo

-

9 -

Therefore,

we submit that the bar on the right is schematically a more accurate
reflection of the title industry's relative cost-involvement when
it handles the escrow or closing function.
On examination, however valid the criticisms in the
HUD-VA Report relating to the title-relating costs and services in
the Los Angeles sub-study may be, these criticisms must be directed
not to the title industry, but at other industries which handle
escrows and closings in that area, and this is principally due to
the fact that in approximately 95% of the transactions comprising
the Los Angeles data base, the escrow and closing function were
performed by industries other than the title industry and that
figure is not much changed today.

Certainly less than 10% of all

escrow and closing services in Los Angeles today are performed by
the title industry.
Hopefully, Mr. Chairman, the foregoing has helped you
and the members of this Committee to place in proper perspective
the cost involvement, both in dollars and as a percent of sales
price, of the title industry in the entire spectrum of settlement
costso

The data show that title insurance and title examination

costs in california are but a small part of overall settlement
costs in this State.

Notwithstanding this fact, the industry has

come in for a lot of criticism.
One critic at the federal level is on record as having
stated, and I quote:
m~ums

"Less
than 3% of the title industry's pre,_

are paid out in losses,

s~

it seems to me this could almost

be construed as a 97% ripoff."
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\
0

Another critic has stated that, "It should take only

l

15 minutes to transfer title to a $40,000 home and that should not
cost any more than to transfer title to a car, which also takes
only 15 minutes."

0

Mr.

Chairman, the answers to both these criticisms lie

in important differences.

And, in attempting to provide you and

the members of your Committee with those answers we hope to enable
0

you to better understand what title insurance is, why it is needed,
and most importantly, exactly what the consumer gets for his dollar,
for the $165 represented in Charts I and II.
In the case of the 3% loss factor, which incidentally

,__. .--... . . p_. . . . ........... 5%. .-,. . . .and
. not 3%, the answer is the vast difference in

~pproximates
~--

--·~

kind between the casualty insurance business and the title insurance
business:

fundamental differences in the expectations of consumers

when they purchase a policy of title insurance as opposed to a
policy of casualty insurance.

A home buyer expects and receives

assurances that upon assuming title to real property the rights of
his predecessors in ownership and all other persons or public
agencies having an interest in that property •••
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Excuse me,

Mr.

Chairman, may I

ask a question here?
You went over that rather rapidly about a 3% which approximates 5%.

Could you give an illustration of what you're talk-

ing about in that particular instance?
MR. McCARTHY:

The statistical data submitted in

California would indicate that the loss ratio for California title
insurers approximates a 5% loss factor, as opposed to 3%.
-

........... .

-- ~- --
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The

proposal in my testimony didn't indicate exactly why that's the
case .
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:
MR. McCARTHY:

You will cover that?

Yes, sir o

ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

All right .

Very good.

CHAIRMAN MCALISTER:

You will tell us why 3% is really

5%?

MR. McCARTHY:

Oh, excuse meo

No, the person who made

this statement used it as an illustration to support his contention
that the title industry is, in his terms, a

11

ripoff", and when I

proposed it, it was to indicate there was a basic

misunderstanding ~

as to what title insurance is and to view the industry's perform-

l

ance on the basis of loss ratio is totally erroneous.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

I would like an illustration of

that if possible.
MR. McCARTHY:

As I indicated, one answer is the vast

differences between the casualty insurance business and the title
insurance business .

The fundamental difference is in the expec-

tations of consumers when they purchase the policy of title insurance as opposed to the policy of casualty insuranceo
The horne buyer expects and receives assurances that
upon assuming title to real property the rights of his predecessors

in ownership and all other persons or public agencies having an
interest in that property are exactly as reported to him by a
title entity, and if correctly reported, he can rely on the financial integrity of his insurer to defend against subsequent attacks

- 12 -

0

ang to compensate him for any losses he might suffer.
1.,

0

-

- ·- · ~

•

'

... -

This is not

'

the case with casualty insurance.
------.. ... -·- ..... . .. . - .
The title insurance is unique and differs markedly
·--~-~

~ -··-

'

from casualty insurance.
0

Title insurance offers protection for

events which have occurred in the past.

casualty insurance, on

the other hand, undertakes to indemnify against damage or loss in
the event of a future occurrenceo

Stated differently, casualty

insurance is basically a process of risk assumption, while title
insurance is basically an informational process resulting in risk
elimination.

Title insurance is a single premium insurance .

same is not true for casualty insurance.

The

Under a title policy,

the insured owner is indemnified against damage or loss during his
entire period of ownership whether it be five years, or 25 years,
or 50 years.
~~ot~cted

In the event of death, his heirs continue to be

under the terms of the policy.

The key distinction,

however, to be drawn between title and casualty insurance lies in
the vast differences in the costs associated with the production
of a policy of title insurance and a policy of casualty insurance.
It is estimated that fully 80% of premium income of a title insurer
is expended in salaries and in direct support of the large numbers

-of....

highly
.
- ... . ···-trained
-.
.. personnel and equipment which must be maintained
as a condition of engaging in the title business. The reason for

t
1

...

this high ratio of production costs to income can only be understood
when one has an understanding of the myriad sources of information

\ which must be consulted prior to being able to properly determine
· whether title to a particular piece of real property is in a
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condition which will allow it to be transferred.

And, without such

understanding, one could easily be led to believe that, indeed,
title to real property can be transferred as inexpensively and
expeditiously as title to an automobile.
I

I

ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Mr.

McCarthy, when title to the

property as evidenced by title insurance is proper and valid up to
the point that purchaser buys it, that has already been done for
the last purchaser, and •••
MR. McCARTHY:

That's

correct~

if you're dealing with
'----

··- ·-- -- .

..

-~

-

--

the same title company •
.____

.,...

....... ·-

ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

O.K.

So really what you're doing

is certifying -- you're still going back and certifying the title
back to the very beginning, to the original land grant, or whatever
it might be.

However, in some of the midwestern states where they

have abstracts of title, the permanent records were established
each time then when the property exchanged hands, it was simply a
matter of going back and pulling out the microfilm of the preceding records, automated, and everything that had to be checked
basically was that simple mechanical operation of bringing it up
to date from the last sales transaction to the presento
MR. McCARTHY:

That's my understanding.

ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Is there any possible way that

our system could be made more efficient?
MR. McCARTHY:

Hopefully, the title industry is in

that process of trying to maintain an efficient system, before
the services are needed by the consurnerso
system that you mentioned •• o
- 14 -

Under this abstract

0

ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

I don't mean that it was efficient,

incidentally •••
MR. McCARTHY:

I think it has proved to be fairly in-

efficient for them, and also it does not really meet the demands
0

of the State having a high volume of real estate activity; number
one being the law, which would state that even if this were vital
information, having an effect on title in that abstract, or in all
the documents posing the chain of title.

If there were incorrect

interpretations of that information, there still would be no liability on the part of the abstractor, if an ordinary man,
of ordinary intelligence, viewing that information would
make a similar mistake.

It's quite similar to the exposure of an

attorney in many areas.

The point here being that the consumer,

if this were "a reasonable mistake", would have absolutely no
protection, nor would he have insurance against the invalidity of
documents •••
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

There would be a rather rudimentary

research procedure, however, which could be developed theoretically
on every piece of property in the State of california, which could
be microfilmed; be made available somehow, perhaps, on a professional basiso

I'm not suggesting state basis --but perhaps kept in a

state location and made available and that way utilized.

We have

nothing of that kind now?
MR. McCARTHY:

Not to my knowledge.

might undertake to do his own abstract

An individual

do his own interpreta-

tion -- but as I will point out later, in the case of an attorney •••
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ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

You made a strong case on the

accuracy of the interpretation of prior transactions of the deeding of property from one individual to another over the years.
What percentage of claims do you have?
.MR. McCARTHY:

This is the 5% figure -- that ' s the

loss paid out- of ··-··
the revenue.
.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

You indicated the 5% revenue and

the 3%.

MRo McCARTHY:

Yes, this seems to be the industry's

experience: it's slightly higher, but not much higher.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Is that considered to be a very

low figure by the industry?

MR. McCARTHY:

Virtually any loss is considered to be

too high by the industry.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Is there any way that that rate

could be brought down?
MR. McCARTHY:

Hopefully, by more efficient record-

keeping systems and better trained personnel.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Do you see any way where there

could be a statewide system of microfilming of property transactions, which would be permanent?
MR. McCARTHY:

I think what we're getting into in this

area is really a fundamental legislative decision on really a
cost benefit analysis.

Would the costs incident to taking such

approach being borne by the public, be sufficient to offset the
advantages that would benefit the public.

In a study of the

Pennsylvania system, and I have to qualify this because I'm not
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0

sure of the exact figures, an amount in the area of about $2.1

0

billion was estimated as the cost of updating the recordation
system in that State.

In California, the magnitude of such cost

would be exceedingly greater than that, and this would have to be

0

balanced against the costs that consumers are presently paying for
this service and the information that they are given.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

All right.

CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Mr. Mccarthy,

0

the title company goes
records?

Thank you.
do I understand that

way back to the year one in checking their

How far back do they go?
MR. McCARTHY:

necessary.

As far back in the chain of title as

There are efficiences; I mean, if the title has been

done then there would be a review of information from that date
forward, provided you're with that particular title insurer and in
that instance there are cost reductions available to the consumer.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

!

next question.

But J! .t~at

O.K.

That was going to be my

company has run a title

~earch,

their

current search would only go back to the time of the last search?
•.__-

...

MRo McCARTHY:

~hat's
. ...... . ... . .

righto

That's on the presumption

that all prior work was correct.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Well, O.Ko, but until you had

some reason to believe otherwise, there is a cost reduction where
---~,..·-·-------.--...-

that occurs?
MR.; McCARTHY:

Yes, approximately 20%, if the transfer

is within two years of the initial sale, and -some insurers provide
--·---·--·- . - -· - - ·- ·--·· --- . --· ....... ---~-~--:-----that
reduction
for
a
period
of
~~~~ seve~_years.
__.,. ____, . . . . _.... _.__--·-------·~=-~~
..._,~- .
. ~------· . ,. . I think the
~··...--··-
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reason for this will come out in my testimony.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

All right.

These other systems

1\
that you're talking about -- are these the so-called "Torrens"
\ systems?

I

MR. McCARTHY:
to is

jus~_ .. ~

. . -----·--

No, what Assemblyman

Ha;td~n. w~s

referring

.:!=orm of title insurance in other states -- the abstract

-

--··-

.

..

.

-

of title approach, the certi·f i cate of title approach and the title
insurance approach, which we would contend would be the most
efficient for a system having a volume of real estate activity of
california.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

But doesn't this tie in to the

so-called Torrens title system?
MR. McCARTHY:

To!.!: ~s

I'm not an expert on the
state~operated

would .. he a

No, it's an

enti~ely

different processo

system, but essentially that

method, people applying to the Clerk of

the Tor~~ns .Court
for a certificate indicating that title is, in
. . . - ..
-.

fact, in that personal form of transfer of the property.

California

incidentally operated under that Torrens system, which proved
extremely inefficient, costly, and did not properly respond to
the demands of the public, and, I believe in the 1930s the system
was abandoneda
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:
on this, Mr. Chairman .

I'm still a little bit confused

I have had some experience here.

Years

ago I made my living by doing title searches, under a completely
different system, and as I indicated, a rather inefficient system.
But my job was examining every record that we could find including
criminal records, guardianship records, every aspect that had
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0

influence to the title itself.

Don't you have an index that you

can utilize to eliminate all of these kinds of things?

There is

a large percentage of them.
MR. McCARTHY:
0

That is exactly what I was going to

cover in my subsequent testimony.

As you are all aware, title

insurance is concerned with real property:

land and things attached

to it are considered part of land, the minerals beneath and airspace above the land, numerous incidental rights.

In contrast,

personal property is all other types of property.

Items of personal

property can be readily examined for possible defects, and the
person in possession is generally presumed to be the owner.

Assur-

ances from a third party as to ownership and the quality and
condition of title are not essential to most transactions involving
personal property, and in situations where such assurances are
essential, it is obtained with relative ease.

This is simply not

the case when you're dealing with real propertyo
When dealing with real property, the common law,
(\ judicial actions, legislative actions, and a constantly changing
\body of law in the area of public records combine to form an im~ressive

hurdle to secure understanding of the condition of title

\

r o a particular piece of property.

On analysis, _it is the law of

~·----~. ~-----·-..

real property that is at the source of most costs associated with
• 'fr

..,,.,.,,.

t

-••-···

... .-..

•

-~- ~~-·-·•-~----~- • .....,. .... . , _ . _ . . , . . , .,..

-···--·--··•--..-_._.,

r-·-.--•••• • ......,....._,..., __ •• .---··"''·--~-·••-·- ·~ -.

what the HUD-VA Report termed title-related costs.

--······-···-··-.... ---- ·-··· ·---·

It has been

'

pointed out that the title examination and title insurance processes
are essentially consumer-protection processes caused by the fact
that our legal system recognizes an amazingly large number of inter... . -........
................---·- ____ ----·-- ..... - ----··---------- .. -. ---- - -- - ----· --- ····------·-ests
iz:t. ) . and
which -·--affect
marketability
of. ...title.
Aside from the
., ,____
- .. -·
.. ·- ·-· -·--·.
.... ---~-·

_,.

_ ,.
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observation, it must be recognized that the sources of record
information having a potential effect on title are many.
Now, it is absolute myth that a person can accurately
determine the status of title by a simple analysis of a chain of
title gleaned from the office of a county recorder.

The law today

provides for numerous public records concerning rights in real
v
v
J
property: records of probate, domestic relations, and civil pro,_ ,

/

ceedings,

~records

of judgments, federal, state and local government

tax liens and special districts having the power to levy taxes or
assessments on real

'
v
property, and

records in federal bankruptcy

proceedings are records generally that must be reviewed and
analyzed prior to being able to properly determine the status of
title.

In Los Angeles County alone, over one million documents

are recorded annually and this is but one source of record information affecting the status of title.

The problem is further com-

pounded by the fact that these record-keeping offices are so fragmented and scattered and so inefficiently arranged that the title
industry has been forced to resort to the construction and maintenance of independent title plants as a means of coping with the
ever-increasing mass of information.
But whether or not the title industry maintains title
plants, the fact remains that the processes of determining what is
recorded against a particular parcel of property and more importantly determining the effect of such recording in the final analysis
is the process which requires time-consuming work and labor of
people..

~

title plant simply makes the process more efficient,
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but a title plant is not a piece of machinery.

Building and main-

taining a plant requires people, as does the process of using that
title plant after it has been built, and so the title industry is
properly characterized as being labor-intensive, rather than capital·... -- . . . ..
...
.
inten~~Y~-~Y~
. ~h~ugh s.u bstantial
capital is required to enter and

---

_____
'

~.

ma~~~in_y~yrself in this business.

Virtually every person employ-

ed in this industry is in one way or the other performing services
relating directly or indirectly to the painstaking and time-consuming
tasks involved in discharging a buyer's and lender's duties of ascertaining the quality and condition of title to real property.
Mr. chairman, as you and the members of this Committee

are aware, our law charges the buyer and the lender with the ultimate responsibility for knowing what has been recorded against
property.

The net effect of recording acts is that buyers and

lenders are presumed to know all facts regarding all the interests
disclosed by the record.

A title entity merely assumes this re-

sponsibility in ascertaining the condition of the record title and
further the responsibility for determining the validity and genuineness of the documents in that chain of title.
is protected
~--....~.

i~s

...

agains~
· ~~~ or.. damag~) if
·-·
'.;;~---

interpretation were incorrect.

................

_ - ..

--~

. ·--··

,.,~..,~-.-,.._..~

.... ~

In brief, the insured

the search of the title and

Beyond that, the industry in

many instances insures over matters affecting title which, if left
unresolved, would require the buyer and lender to engage in costly
and time-consuming legal actions to perfect title.
accepting the basic premise

And so, even

of the two critics of the industry

referred to earlier, their conclusions are falseo
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Assuming for the

moment that the industry's losses are 3%, the remaining 97% is not
a ripoff.

And even if title to real estate can be transferred in

15 minutes, there are literally hours of behind-the-scenes time
expended to enable a title entity to determine whether or not title
is ready to be transferred.

Implicit in the 97% argument is the

assumption that the title entities either do not employ large
numbers of highly-trained people, or even worse those that are
employed are not compensated.

--

In norma! _ y~ars, fully 50% of the

-----

~

•

04-

··-

,•••

-~---

industry's expenses go into direct payroll and employee ben~fit
'
·~ ·-··- - -·-·plans. Most of the remaining expenses are in support - of
that basic
.... ··----

-

-- -----.........

peop~~

cost: to provide workers with places to _work and the nee-

...... -. ...

essary tools of their tradeo
and the

high _ ?os~

Title plants are but one such tool,

of building and upkeep of a title

plab~ ·merely

makes much more efficient what would otherwise be a far more
costly and time-consuming personal search of public records.

It

is absolutely essential that a plant be kept current on a daily
basis.

It is only by this method that our industry can properly

discharge its obligations to its consumers.

It is not difficult

to comprehend the labor and labor-related costs associated with
transferring into a useable format, information contained in over
one million documents recorded annually in this County or for
that matter any county in this Stateo

Nor should it be difficult

to understand the magnitude of these same costs incurred when
these same documents are later examined to determine whether or not
they affect ownership rights to a particular piece of real property.

Stated broadly, the fact is that it is only by incurring
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these costs that the title industry is in a position to inform its
consumers of the exact status of titleo

It is the maintenance and

the providing of this information which in the vast number of cases
enable buyers and lenders to secure possession and title to their
homes in a secure manner.
So, one other answer to the critic who referred to the
industry's low loss ratio of 3% might have been that the industry
strives for a zero loss ration.

The answer would not be altogether

facetious if one really understands the title industry.

On the

other hand, the answer would not be accurate because the industry
knows there will be losses on matters that are not disclosed by
any search of the public records, however careful and painstaking
that search may beo

These are losses insured against in the policy,
~~rgeri~s

which arise out of off record risks, such as
tencies.

or incompe-

Generally speaking, as you are aware, recording acts are

construed to relate only to valid instruments.

They afford abso-

lutely no protection when the estate or the interest dealth with

is invalido

This is so even though the parties are unaware of the

invalidity, the title industry suffers losses from these types of
risks every day.
Another answer to the same critic lies in the fact that

I_._._

the conduct of a title industry is truly a high-risk business

venture, not as was explained earlier in the sense of insurance
risk assumption, but in the sense of potential return on invested

....capital .

, .-

-

•

·-· --•

•

--

-

-

•

-u

-

· -•

-- •·- - -•

•·

-

The existence of this high-risk element is inherent in

the fact that the demand for the title industry's products and
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services is a secondary demand, utterly and totally dependent upon
the primary demand for real estate and real estate loanso

It is

well known that this primary demand for housing and loan funds is
subject to radical cyclical movement.

This fact and the fact that

the title industry is highly labor-intensive and has a high ratio
of fixed costs to variable costs, combine to make the industry•s
revenues and profits highly volatile.
Now normally where an industry is subject to these
volatile cyclical variations in its revenues and profits, capital
investors ordinarily are able to demand and receive a higher return
on their investment than in an industry that is not subject to such
cyclical variations.

This is not true for the title insurers in

this State.
An analysis of the Form 9 Annual Reports of all title
insurers admitted to do business in California, serves to illustrate
both the cyclical nature of demand for the industry•s services and
the fact that the industry return on capital, while highly volatile,
is not excessiveo

Focusing

on the five-year business cycle ending in

1973 and commencing with 1969, the data shows that the five-year
average after-tax rate of return on capital for all admitted
. -··- --···· ... - . .
~-

Cali~ia

title insurers ~ } -43%. Within this cycle, the same
--- -- - -------........ ___..-:
rate of return ranged from a low of 2.8% in 1969 , the year of low
real estate volume, to a high of 11.55% in 1972, a period of high

real estate activity.

It is important to note that if this five-

year cycle has moved up one year, that is to include the years

1970-74, it is projected that the average after-tax rate of return
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on capital for California insurers will be less than the 7.43%
average for the 1969-73 period.

This fact points up well the

necessity for viewing the profitability of industries, such as
ours, on a cyclical, rather than an annual basis if you desire to
obtain a true picture of the overall profitability of the industry.
By way of rough comparison, the 7.43% after-tax rate of return on
capital realized by california

i~-~-~;§l_~ __Q:V§l.~.. ~pj.._s_ ~~y.e-year

w~~k i~th~-~~==-~-.9.£ 87_.!:.~.~2:~~.~~-~ composed

..

-- .. . . . -period
·-

of 858 ~~panies which comprise the Standard and Poor • s--cornpu'ftfai:---·a.1:U1Uai
industrial tape.

---··--····-·-·-.... ---~

.

(J.

For these 87 industries, the median after-tax

rate of return on capital for the period of 1960-1969 was 10o25%,
with 85% of the industries studied having a rate of return in
excess of 8%.

This information strongly suggests that the industry•s

profits can hardly be termed excessive.
From time to time it is said that since the title
findustry•s charges are based on the monetary size of a transaction,
'

the industry must be profiting from inflation at the expense of
/the consumer.

Theoretically, given the present rate structure for

title insurance, if the general rate of inflation is 10%, for
example, a title cornpany•s revenues would increase by only 5%.
At the same time, its costs, which as you will recall are largely
people-related costs, would increase at the same

1~/o

level. Appli-

cation of this theory by one member of our industry resulted in
the following:

From the close of 1970 to May of 1974, the horne

ownership cost index for Los Angeles showed an increase of 19%,
while the building cost index for the same area increased by 23o8%.
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Application of an average 20% increase to the sales price of a
horne which sold in 1971 for $30,000 and comparing the cost of
title insurance at the original $30,000 and at the inflated $36,000
figure, resulted in an increase of revenues to the title insurers
of 10.3%.

Over the same period of time, the average salary paid

by this insurer to its almost 6,000 employees rose by 23o3%. The
result is that inflation has reduced this insurer's profits, and
this experience is typical of the entire california title industry.

-

And while there have been numerous filings with the Insurance De----------- ------- -- - ------- -· ------- --partrnent_t,g increase rat~..a -Gver thi-s · pexJQ.d, the operation of
--------------------------- ---market forces has compelled the abandonment of these attempts by
industry members simply in order to stay conpetitive
substantial losses of business.

and avoid

Stated differently, in the absence

of a price increase and with runaway inflation having increased
both the price of real estate and most of the title industry's costs,
the price of title insurance to the consumer in real dollars has
decreased markedly over the past four years.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

As I understand it, when the

price goes up, your rates go down.
MR. McCARTHY:

The rate of increase is not on a one-

for-one basis, as it is with many related costso

It approximates

one-half of the rate of inflation; it's what the data would indicate .
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

The larger the deal, the

money involved, the lower proportionately your rate is.
MR. McCARTHY:

That's one factor, yes.

From our earlier comments, it should be evident that
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the title industry has always been concerned with the inefficient
and costly public record-keeping systems, which are known today in
California and elsewhere.

That concern continues today, and the

title industry in California continues to seek still more efficient
ways in which to discharge the buyer's and the lender's responsibilities to make sure that their title is goodo

Thus, for example,

refinements are being made every day in the industry's procedures
and methods.

Beyond that, many

mernb~_§- o:t

the

-~-Il<Ju~:J:.EU~~j.c~~te

---~---·.-"'

in so-called joint title plants in order to

the cost
---=-------=-----------,.----.,,..,..- -·-----.
. . . ,. - . . .

among
.two or more title companies and to hold the line on expenses.
Computerization is

.---

----

~ng__;:~.§.Q;:,ted

able to that approacho

.

~ead

._e----...,~-·-

to in functions that are adapt-

·-····-···-H". . . . ._...__,., ..... . . . .
_.~

~-·~-.. "'~---..----

·-------.. . . . ____. . . . . .,_. ·-··-

And the industry supports those proposals

------..------~·--···-

in pending federal legislation which would direct the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development to establish and place in operation
on a demonstration basis in various areas of the United States, one
or more model systems for more efficient and simpler maintenance . of
public land records.

We view such efforts as but one further step

in the long history of innovative efforts to provide an efficient,
accurate and speedy method of delivering vital information to
persons dealing with real property.

The need for this service has

existed under our common law heritage since well before the year
1200 and continues today.

The relative short history of California

has seen the abstract of title give way

t~

a certificate of title

which eventually gave way to title insurance -- such changes being
in direct response to the rapid social and economic growth coupled
with a demand for financial responsibility in the event of error.
While many of these earlier practices are still the norm in other
- 27 -

states, their application to California is no longer economically
feasible.
The title industry welcomes constructive advances in
the field of public land records, and we are confident that any
efforts at such improvement will serve to point out the extent to
which this industry has contributed to the public welfare.

One

need only picture a system without the title industry's contribution
in order to understand this point.

Visualize, if you will, each

of the approximate 20,000 real estate transactions in Los Angeles
county in a typical month requiring a personal search of the public
records by the buyer, by the lender, or by their representatives.
Picture each of those transactions also requiring a
separate filing for record of documents affecting title, with none
of the efficiencies which are present when the title entities group
all their transactions into a single filing for the convenience of
the county recorder.

Without the title industry's contributions

to the system, literally hundreds of thousands of additional dollars
would be required to provide additional space, additional equipment
and additional government employees needed to serve the public.
Admittedly, Los Angeles is an extreme example, but the
point is valid for most california counties.

All this additional

cost would have to be borne by the public, either in higher taxes
or by way of increased charges to the users of the system.
Mr. chairman and members of the Committee, the california

land title industry, as represented by the CLTA, believes it has,
over the years, made a very important contribution to the economic
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and social growth of this State.

Its products and services are

needed by the construction industry, the real estate industry, the
lending industry, and most of all by the consumers.

In a very real

sense, the rapid and efficient transfer and encumbrance of real
property which are at the heart of california's growth would not
have been possible without the important contribution of the title
industry.

In comparison with the other components in the staggering

array of services which together make up settlement costs, the amount
that the title industry receives for its important contribution to
horne ownership and real property financing and to the past and
future economic well-being of this State is modest indeed.
Speaking for the California Land Title Association, I
wish to thank you and the members of the Committee for this opportunity to put into proper perspective the title industry's role in
the settlement process.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Mr. McCarthy, on what grounds or

on what basis does the industry establish their premiums?
MRo McCARTHY:

I'm not an expert.

The Association, as

such, is expressly precluded by statute from involving itself in
rates.

However, I could conjecture that the rates are established

on the basis of historical costs associated with personnel, equipment, maintenance of title plants, and projections on the possible
loss factor that may result from transactions in any given yearo
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Your loss factor would have to be

a minor element, since your losses are so lowo
MR. McCARTHY:

I agree, but the exposures are nonetheless

-
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there and ·.:hare • s a great
thing that .

c~uld

de=-~-

')f. c~r..cern over a mistake or some-

turn a $ 1.65 transaction to a $3 0 or $40, 000 loss o

:HAIRMAN

Mc~~ISTER:

All right; thank you.

Assemblyman Knox, who joined us a few minutes ago .

Mr. McCarthy_

We welcome

Th~nk

you,

Next we have Mr. Steve Baker of the Department of

Consumer Affairso
lV.IR. STEVE BAKER:

Mr. Chairman and Members, the State

Department of Consumer Affairs welcomes these hearings, as an informationa l so·c.rce.

It is also an important opportunity to express

our conviction that consumers must be placed in a more equitable
position in relation to the financial institutions involved with
real property

f~nancing.

These hearings have been scheduled during a period
which is common knowledge to all:

the housing industry is experi-

encing the brunt of our economic difficultieso
down; interest rates are higho

Housing starts are

The consumer's need for housing

remains stronger than ever, and the industry's or market's response

is weak.

In short, the industry would appear to be depressed;

these are inflationary times.

It's unfortunately true, however,

that at the same time the average American family, particularly in
the last four years, cannot afford the average American new horne;
and as the consurr;er needs this industry, the industry obviously
needs the consumer.

It is a two-way street.

I should emphasize at this point that we're not going
to be talking to all of the possible points that might be contained
in these hearings, but what we are about to propose, I think will
speak to many of them.
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In our investigation of consumer problems associated
with real property financing, such problem areas as late payment
charge~,

prep~e~_ J?enalties,
-----·
··-...
.

c~~~~es, or due-on-sale
--·-··-------··-···-···-------------------·---._ --cl~ses~ and non-payment of interest on impound accounts associated
----- .... _.. __ --...... ---·-·-- ----- . -- __. .. -...--- ......... ----··- .
. - -.
wi~~~~~~ loans, we came again and again to a recurring ques-----·-- .......
··- --- .. .
. ... - - ... ·-·. ·- ····-·· ·-- --- -··
tLon:
·~at are the real costs associated with a savings and loan
---------------·-···--··· .... - ......
----------·--------.. - ·---And
what
relationship
exists
or a _ba~_lo.~p._._service
department?
.. .. _____ ____ ·- . ... . . - .. . . ..
_.._..

-..

-

acceleration
..

.

....

_

._

_

..._ ,

.,

'

'

between such costs and the fees and penalties charged consumers
purportedly to cover these costs?"

And the recurring need arose

for a cost analysis of these loan service departments at banks and
savings and loan associations in order to determine these actual
administrative costs.
And the administrative costs of which we speak are
those costs associated primarily with the imposition of late payment charges, such as actual bookkeeping and billing expenses as
well as the loss of interest incurred by the lending institution-:
the administrative costs connected with the imposition of a prepayment penalty and how much real income is actually foregone by
a lending institution because of a prepayment: how much has it
really cost a lender when one loan is closed and another extended?
What actual cost does a lender experience or incur when an already
existing loan is assumed by a third party?

And just what are the

real costs to a lending institution that would justify the imposition of an acceleration clause and cause a refinancing of an
already existing loan at a much higher rate of interest?

What

maintenance costs are related to impound accounts for property
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insurance and taxes that justify not one penny of interest being
paid on these oftentimes substantial amounts, and how do these
costs compare with the millions of dollars that consumers in this
State lose every year due to this non-payment of interesto
Almost invariably the defense or one of the primary
defenses made for these various fees, aside from their punitive
impact, is administrative cost.

What are these administrative

costs, and what relationship do they bear to fees and penalties
imposed?
Let us examine, for example, late payment penalties.
The average banking institution in

th~

State is currently assess-

ing late payment penalties in the amount of 4 or 5% of the monthly
installment due.

The average savings and loan association is

assessing somewhat less than 10% of the installment dueo

The

average savings and loan association is assessing its amount at
the same time the banks are assessing a substantially less amount.
Yet we can look to the Veterans Administration where 4% of the
monthly installment due is levied; to the FHA where 2% is assessed.
The State Superintendent of Banking in New York proposed 2% as a
penalty claiming, and I quote:

11

This figure is more than sufficient

to cover a few days of extra interest and any computer printed
late notices."

The 2% figure was passed, and is now law in the

State of New York.

As the Superintendent of Banking in New York

has stated, and I quote once again,

11

The threat of foreclosure was

a more effective. impetus to prompt payment than highly profitable
late payment operations."
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In two comparatively recent court cases (Clermont vs.
Secured Investment Corp. and Garrett vs. coast & Southern Federal
Savings and Loan), it was the opinion of the court in each case
that late payment penalties must reflect actual damages and that
the late payment penalty must bear a reasonable relationship to
probable loss incurred by the lender .

It is in the light of such

decisions, as well as the institutional rates I mentioned before
in a brief comparison, that we do not believe a 10% figure, for
example, on a late payment penalty figure is a responsible figure.
We are, however, left with a problem, and it's very real.
not just our problem alone.
determine what constitutes

It's

How does a consumer, or even a court,
11

a reasonable relationship to probable

loss" without knowing what costs are incurred by lenders?

A

standard cost must be determined in order to have a basis of cornparison between actual damages incurred and fees addressed consumers.
It is important to note that those extending mortgages
are already the most advantaged creditors aroundo

Borrowers in

the form of homeowners are less likely to be late or default on
their obligations than are other debtors.

If they do have finan-

cial problems, they will most likely defer payment or default on
less dear possessions than their homes.

The security for the
------~

------.-.....__ . _. -

lender
is almost always
more
than.. .........
the--......out~.
t-~nding debto
Retailers
,_..
---·----··
.......
_., ....... ..,
... - .......
in this State have little or no security and yet are limited to
---------------~-

~_

-~-- ~-····

. .-

5% of the installment due for delinquency.

·-~

_,.

Those who make auto-

mobile loans have little security and experience great risk and
difficulty in repossession and yet are limited to 5% of the

-
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installment due through provisions of the Rees-Levering Act.
These figures were established in the absence of case law indicating that fees should bear a reasonable relationship to liquidated
damages.

In light of the legal admonition in the Garrett case

alone, I think that the need for an accounting of the costs associated with the imposition of late fees becomes all the more apparent and necessary.
How do real costs relate to fees charged?

It would

appear that late payment penalties should compensate lenders only
for actual losses of interest and for the cost of processing delayed payments and reminder noticeso

This amount seems to provide

an adequate incentive for timely payment in the examples to which
I previously referred:

FHA, or VA, or the state banks of New York;

but we need to know base costs.
In the example of prepayment penalties, or as it elsewhere is referred to as prepayment charges, it is worthwhile to
note that such charges were originated to protect lenders against
declining interest rates.

Mortgagors were to be dissuaded from

refinancing their loans simply because a lower rate of interest
was available elsewhere.

But prepayment penalties have stayed

with us even during the latest period of steeply rising interest
rates.

Only the rationale for their existence has changed.
Current justifications for prepayment penalties center

about, first, providing the lender with stable income over a period
of time and, second, covering administrative costs involved with
closing out the old loan and financing another borrower .
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But what costs are we talking about?

The
average
life
...._ .
...---· .............. ,
~- ~·.,.

·-~

of a mo~n is ~I?EOX ~EJ.2.:':.~2-~.-§.§l.Y~..n...y..e.ars _ J.n ..:t;..h~.~ ...~:t,.~~.=.~

In

Southern California, the life of a mortgage loan averages less
than five years .

The penalty generally assessed a consumer, if

he or she can pay more than 20% of the loan amount in any one year,
is a standard six months interesto

Thus we are faced with the

spectre of prepayment penalties being assessed in substantial amounts
on the average mortgage loan .
It is at such a juncture that we need to ask ourselves
if the present period of time in which a prepayment penalty is
assessed, perhaps 5 to 7 years, is justified due to cost .

We need

to ask ourselves what would happen if the cutoff point after which
no prepayment penalty were assessed, or could be assessed, were
lowered to five, four, or even three years.

Indeed, we should know

the hard cost data that justifies the imposition of a prepayment
penalty at all during a period of steeply rising interest rates, .
such as the kind we're currently experiencing.
The lending institutions' concern at not receiving
full interest if the borrower prepays does not appear to be valid
at all.

An institution can reloan or invest the money prepaid al-

most immediately without suffering a loss .

What the lender might

lose because of a prepayment is easily recouped by finance charges
or closing costs as well as a still higher rate of interest.

In

fact, today, rising interest rates almost assure the lender of an
even greater return on his money should it be necessary to find
a new borrower.
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We have to ask ourselves the hard questions:

Do pur-

ported costs to lenders justify the current period of time during
which prepayment penalties are assessed?

Are prepayment penalties

justified at all in periods of rising interest rates?
Indeed, today, a lending institution may assess a
penalty and demand that the entire existing loan be paid off at
the time of sale.

The "due on sale" provisions in mortgage loan

contracts are otherwise known as acceleration charges or acceleration clauses.

These clauses accelerate the point in time at which

a loan is due.

Consequently, consumers may be charged a prepayment

penalty as well as be required to pay off their already existing
loan.

It is claimed that prepayment penalties cover costs and

prqvide stable income for lenders.

But is it not true that lenders

more than recoup any losses when they accelerate a prior loan and
refinance a new loan at a higher interest rate?
Again, we need to know just what costs need to be
covered, and in what amounts they need to be covered before we can
prescribe an amount by which prepayment penalties should be lowered.
But more importantly, the hard cost data associated with closing
an old loan and administering a new loan must be determined to
justify the very imposition of a prepayment penalty.

We need a

standard against which to determine when penalties are cost-justified
and when penalties are assessed for pure profit.
There are indeed a number of legitimate consumer concerns with real property financingo

Aside from prepayment penalties,

late payment penalties, acceleration clauses, and a host of others,
there remains the problem of non-payment of interest on impound
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accounts.

The impound accounts to which we refer are the accounts

which are established when a mortgage loan is extendedo

Mortgagors

pay into these trust accounts for the purpose of insuring that
property taxes and insurance are paid in a timely fashion.

It is

our understanding that with the passage of AB 1514 and Senate Bill
1748, the consumer's decision as to whether or not to enter into
an impound account arragement was to be made voluntary and that he
was to be informed of the unavailability of interest.

But should

that consumer still decide to enter into the impound account arrangement was to be made voluntary and that he was to be informed
of the unavailability of interesto

But should that consumer still

decide to enter into the impound account arrangement, no interest
is payable on the oftentimes substantial monies involved.

Lenders

claim that no interest is paid because of the maintenance costs
associated with these impound accounts.

There are a substantial

number of these accounts presently; accounts bearing no interest.
The cost study which we advocate would determine the
validity of the claim that no interest is paid because of the
cost of administering these accounts is so much.
ask ourselves a basic question:

11

Again, we must

How does the cost of maintaining

an impound account compare to the millions of dollars lost by consumers every year because no interest is paid on them?

Are lend-

ing institutions actually profiting by the use of monies contained
in these accounts more than they are suffering in administrative
costs? 11
Should we make absolute recommendations, we fully
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realize that you would request, or hope you would request, hard
cost data.

We are, as you have no doubt observed, in the very

uncomfortable position of saying a 10% charge on a late installment
due is too high; even 6% seems too high.

Prepayment penalties

appear to be excessive, particularly when interest rates are rising.
It appears that interest rates should be offered on impound accounts.
But intuition, the experience of other lending institutions and the
conduct of other states takes us only so far.

Whether we concern

ourselves with the specific penalties and fees I have mentioned, or
seek to explore still others, central to the justifications for
these various penalties and fees is the repeated claim that they
are needed to cover costs.

Central to our consideration of these

various penalties, or indeed central to any rational and complete
analysis, is the need to determine just what these costs are by
asking the question:

"What is the cost of a savings and loan or

bank loan service function?"

Only by determining how fees charged

relate to real costs incurred will we be able to judge the validity
of claims which hold that all is justified due to cost.

It is a

fundamental necessity that a standard of cost be determined and
made available.
In order for the recommended study to be impartial and
unbiased, in order for this analysis to be meaningful and at all
forthright, it is of paramount importance that it be undertaken by
an impartial and independent entity.
We find it difficult to believe to say the least that
banks and savings and loan associations are not sufficiently aware

-
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of their own costs associated with the imposition of late payment
penalties, or prepayment penalties, loan assumptions, impound
accounts, et cetera, to provide us with figures, and yet they are
somehow magically able to determine the size and duration of penalties assessed consumers.
In essence, Mr. chairman and Members, we need an impartial and unbiased assessment of the costs actually incurred by
a loan service department or function, as a basis against which
to measure the validity or reasonableness of fees charged consumersa
It is our strong recommendation that the need for such
a study be recognized as fundamental, and that the study be undertaken in order to determine fact.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Thank you, Mr. Baker.

welcome Assemblyman Mike Cullen to our gathering today.

Let me
Mr.

Hayden has a question.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Mr. Baker, do you have specific .

recommendations as to who should be involved or who should be
charged with the making of this study?

Are you, for example,

suggesting that the State Legislature mandate the State Department
of Consumer Affairs to make such a study, or that some other administrative department of state government make it and that information come back to the Legislature?
MRo BAKER:

Well, I think, with reference to the state

Department of Consumer Affairs conducting it, as far as its ability
presently to conduct it, it's more or less a baby department.
funding is smallo

The

What we had in mind was an independent or im-

partial entity away from some state departments, perhaps certain
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consulting firms.

We didn't want to get into the mechanisms of it,

but if you wanted a suggestion, we would suggest the Legislative
Analyst's office, or the Auditor General.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

You're suggesting an independent

legislative study, rather than one which would involve the savings
and loan department, or the state banking department?
MR. BAKER:

I'm not really aware of the abilities of

either one of those two departments to naturally undertake the
study.

Let's say they were.

I think that we would still urge that

it be more of an independent entity than those that you just mentioned.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

They are regulatory agencies in a

sense rather than investigative.
costs of administration are far

Is it your impression that the
~ower

than the amount of benefit

gained by the savings and loans, banks, and so forth, than on impound accounts?
MR. BAKER:

With reference to impound accounts?

ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Yes, the amount of monies paid

into those and then utilized.
MR. BAKER:

Well, as I am sure each and everyone of

you is aware, and all the people in the audience are aware, any
mortgage loan is a substantial amount of

money~

any impound ac-

count connected with that loan is oftentimes a very substantial
amount of

money~

and even though a borrower can enter into an im-

pound account in full knowledge that no interest will be paid on
that account, the fact remains that no interest is borne by the
account, and we believe that represents literally millions of

- 40 -

dollars lost to California consumers for an unsubstantiated and an
unjustified reason: namely, costs associated with maintenance of
those accounts.

We haven't seen a study done: we are not aware of

the actual costs associated with them, but we strongly suspect that
they aren't anywhere near those millions of dollars which are lost
to consumers every year.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

But they might be similar in cost

to my own savings account.
MR. BAKER:

Somewhat similar, but impound accounts are

somewhat different.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Administrative cost wise?

Are

they different?
MR. BAKER:
0

Well, there may be a case made for even

more transactions, I'm not sure.

You know, you pay into the im-

pound account annually, or semi-annually.

Paid out of that account

are property taxes, property insurance premiums, and we just don't
see a high maintenance cost associated with those accounts enough
to justify no interest being paid on them whatsoever.

We need to

determine this as fact.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

You know, we've been hearing about

these impound accounts and prepayment penalties for years .

I am

curious about the sudden interest of the Department of Consumer
Affairs.

How long have you been a member of that Department?
MR. BAKER:

I have been a member of that Department

for four months.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

Four months?
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I note you are a

Staff Analyst.

How many staff Analysts are there in the Department?

MR. BAKER:

We have a grand total of three.

ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

Three?

And that covers the entire

spectrum of all activities from groceries, to automobiles, to
television sets, to anything that you want to name.
MR. BAKER:

A more accurate description would be

understaffed a
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

Well, I realize, of course, there's

a change in the administration corning up, and it may well be some
changes in the function of the various departments when the Governor
takes over.

But I'm just curious that your primary recommendation

here is that there be an independent study of the issues.

Are you

familiar with any of the studies that have been made over the years
by the Legislature, the Superintendent of Banks, and by various
other functionaries of state government?
MR. BAKER:

We're not familiar with any study that has

been accomplished by anybody that gets into actual context with
what administrative costs are for the banks and savings and loan
associations.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

You have formed a flat conclusion

that administrative costs per se, that is the cost of clerical work,
the cost of supervising the clerical work.

Are they only defen-

sible costs?
MR. BAKER:
measures.

No.

Definitely not; they're punitive

For example, with their late payment penalties.a.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

MR.

BAKER:

Punitive measures?

Well, measures thato ••
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ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:
making payments late.

The borrower would be punished for

Hopefully, that will correct him to do

right in the futureo
MR. BAKER:

Right.

CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Any other questions or comments?

Thank you, Mr. Baker.
MR. BAKER:

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

We will break for lunch and come

back at one o'clock.
RECESS
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:
come to order again.

The meeting of the Committee will

Since this morning, we have been joined by

Assemblyman Mobley from the Fresno areao
Our next witness will be Commissioner Gleeson L. Payne
of the Department of Insurance.

You have brought with you

Mr. Lawrence c. Baker, your Chief Deputy.
MR. GLEESON L. PAYNE:

Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity of appearing before your committee.

I am in my last few days of my career

as a bureaucrat, but I would like to state that I came here particularly to pay tribute to the way in which you carry on your Committee and the integrity with which you go about your obligations
and duties.

I have, as you mentioned, with me Chief Deputy

Lawrence Baker, whom I would like to have bring you up to date on
the activities of the Insurance Department, and what we have been
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doing in addressing ourselves to the subject of title insurance in
the State of californiao
MR. LAWRENCE C. BAKER, JR. :

Mro Chairman, my name is

Lawrence c. Baker, Jr.; I am chief Deputy Insurance Commissioner.
It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon and to address your
Committee, and we appreciate the opportunity to give the Committee
our views of the title insurance industry and how it fits into the
overall picture of the closing and settlement costs that are part
of

~he

real estate transaction.
I was not here this morning but I can see from the

chart on the pedestal that there has been some discussion of just
what part the title insurance industry plays in the overall settlement costs, and it is our observation that they are relatively a
small part but I don't think that in any way diminishes the necessity to examine title insurance, as it relates to the real estate
industry because every component that goes into closing costs is
contributing to the ability of purchasers of real property to be
able to afford the purchase.

This is particularly true in today's

environment where real estate values are going up very rapidly and,
generally speaking, title insurance costs along with other types
of costs go up right along with the increase in value.

The costs

of title insurance are generally computed in relation to the amount
of the transaction involved.
Title insurance in our observation, at least in our
studies of this business in the past few years, must first be
recognized in its relationship to the overall real estate transaction in -the mechanism of just exactly how it works and how
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i~

then use a subsidiary organization of some kind to refurbish the
real estate.

They then put the real estate onto the market through

their subsidiary that acts as a real estate broker.

When the sale

is made, they handle the escrow in their own escrow company and
they might perhaps have a title insurance company to handle the
title insurance, and they might have a savings and loan subsidiary
to handle the loan:

the whole thing being done within one financial

conglomerate and offering a package of services to the person
participating in the real estate transaction.
Now, the thing that the buyer or seller of real estate
is going to focus on is, of course, the real estate itself.

The

other things that go with that real estate are very much secondary
considerations, and I think probably in the case of title insurance
that there practically is no focus at all on the part of the purchaser or seller of the real estate, as to the cost certainly of
title insurance, or even who they're purchasing it from.
Not too long ago I purchased a horne myself, and I asked the title insurance from one carrier, and the escrow company
told me that you just can't get it from that guy; you have to take
it from the one we give it too

And I asked for the escrow to be

handled in a bank, and they said, "No, you have to have it in this
escrow company."

And that was when a real estate broker was in-

volved, so like the normal purchaser I simply succumbed to the
desires of the real estate broker as to how that thing was handled.
I really didn't know what the cost of any of these elements was
going to

b~ un~il

the closing and they gave me a statement and
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said, here's what you pay.

So you really don't have any opportunity

to bring the normal open market forces to bear on title insurance
costs, or escrow costs.

You pretty much take it the way the real

estate broker hands it to you.

If the real estate broker is doing

his job, he will, of course, see that title insurance, the organization that handles the escrow, all of the other elements involved
in closing real estate transactions are at the lowest possible
cost in order to benefit his principal.
But, over the past few years as I say, the tendency
to develop combinations of entities handling the real estate transaction has been increasingo

At the same time within the title

insurance industry, the extent of dominance by a single title
insurer has been gradually diminishing.

Where now we find the

largest title insurer in the State in 1973 had 44¥/o of the market,
that is down about five points from what they had two years earlier.
But, at one time, I believe the percentage of the market that the
title insurer had approached 75%.

Now, in addition to the market

being dominated less by a single title insurer, there have been
new title insurers commencing operations both through original
formations of companies and through foreign companies entering this
jurisdiction.

We have now about 19 title insurers that are licensed

to do business in california, and we have observed over the past
two or three years that there is active competition among those
title insurers, but their competition until just lately has not
focused very much on the purchaser or seller of real estate; rather
it has focused on those individuals who direct these sales to the
particular title insurer.

In that connection, we became aware a
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ac ~!y~_'!;.y__
.. :·~---··-- ........ -·--·

couple of years ago of considerable

--

l:!!

ways to rebate a

-···-.....

...

.. -.

~

part of the fees•"'- of the tit±e--i -ns.ur.st+......:f::.o the real estate
principally, but

a~~o o!he~ ~~t~t ~ es

sales of title insurance.

-- --·· ._.... - ·-

bro~ ;:ers

that control or direct the

We began an investigation into the ex-

tent of these rebate activities and became convinced that there
were serious abuses developing and, of course, this adds to the
cost of the title insurance.

Our first reaction was that we would

immediately go out and investigate and find the extent of rebating,
and find the insurers that were participating.

But we found just

about all of them were doing it to one degree or another, and the
investigation and extent of fines was so massive as to make it
probably a practical impossibility to really carry it out.
So, as an alternate, before really making an intensive
investigation into the actual dollar amount of rebating, we tried
to determine with the assistance of the title insurance industry,
which was cooperative in this endeavor, the types of activity that
were involved in rebating.

We then issued a bulletin early this

year which gave a very strong enforcement posture on our part and
enumerated those types of activities, which we deemed to be unlawful.

Now, there has been practically none of the direct dollar

under-the-table rebating to our observation where a title insurer
would give back so many dollars for referring a title
order.

insura~ce

But the forms of rebating consisted principally of various

kinds of favors that were bestowed upon the people who referred
title insurance business.

This took the form of free services, of

compensating bank balances deposited in consideration of them
getting a loan from a bank, o-£ lavish entertainment; , er purchasing
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advertising in a house organ that was printed by a real estate
firma

Those kind of things.
Well, our bulletin was issued this year; I believe on

January 8.

We cited all of these practices and said that we would

vigorously enforce the rebate laws from that time forward.

A couple

of months later we began to get a number of complaints from title
insurers that their competitors were violating this anti-rebate
statuteo

We made investigations and in every case subpoenaed

evidenceo

We recently levied rather heavy fines which totaled
---·--·------- ·- - - - - - - - - ----------·· -----·- ·::..--·-----.

--------

over $400, .9..Q.Q__2g_~-~p._f?_!;__~he •• •
·-~

.......

ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

The rebate regulations applied to

the title insurance company, to the buyer of the property, or to
the real estate broker?
MR. BAKER:
statute.

The rebate statute is a very broadly worded

It forbids tit l e insurers to pay any consideration
------- --- . _ _________ to
____.. ___
- - ---------~ - -----

------- --- - --

either the purchaser of the insurance or his agent, which is the

- ----.

-----~-------------~---

·-- ... -

- -

··· -

-- -·-

-

real estate agent or his lender.

.-----------..

____ --- ---

'('"--------- ----------

.

Now, we have observed, with one

_______ _

possible exception, there's just about no
rebating
......·-- --- - -----·---...-directly
--. - ____ ,.. to the
· ---~~

-

-~

consumer.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

I practice law and sometimes I get

involved in real estate transactions for clients, and I think most
of the title companies send me a calendar or something for Christmaso
If . ···---...-they --- do,
is ·-·-----·that···---considered
a - rebate?
--- -------· --·---- ·-· ---. MR. BAKER:

If you had directed, say, the title insur-

ance to a particular title insurer, as a consequen~~-- gf _re~~J..~;ng
- --.------;>'-·-·---------------... ________ ,,______ .. _
this calendar, that would be a rebate, yeso Now, of course,
there are a minimum -- you have to show that there is an inducement.
Yes.
- 49 -

ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

In other words, just showing that

they sent me a calendar, you would have to show that the consideration is a calendar, or lunch, or whatever it is, that I directed
some business in that direction.
MRo BAKER:

I don't think that it would be necessary

that you actually respond to the inducement, but you would have to
show intent was to induce you to direct title
ins~rer · -~ in..t~n-t:

them.

-- that the title

was to ~nd}:IC~ .¥ou ~~ - direct title insurance_ t?

Now, you might never send them a title policy, but if it can

be demonstrated that they were attempting to induce you to by giving you some kind of consideration, that would be an unlawful rebate.

They would be guilty of offering it, you would not, neces-

sarily, be guilty of accepting a rebate in that instance.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Apparently, some of the industry

didn't believe you when you sent out your bulletin earlier this
year.
MRo BAKER:

They believe us now.

I think that's cor-

rect, although, in all honesty there was probably a great deal of
disagreement as to the interpretation of some of the points in the
bulletin.

We thought that it was quite finite; we worked with

the title insurance industry in arriving at language that everybody could understand in this bulletin.

But there seems to be at

least in certain quarters some feeling that the bulletin would be
enough by itself; that we would really never enforce it.

And as

a consequence, we found some extensive violatj,.o ns of the bulletin,
we don't believe that these violations are occurring today because
we have enforced it and we've levied some very heavy fines.

- so -

And we

think that the rebating bulletin, essentially, accomplished it's
purpose.

The more serious and the kinds of practices which were

·-------------really corrosive on the industry were stopped quite soon after the
~------------ ---·-------~-----------------------------·---------

bulletin was issued.

Some of the lesser evil practices continued.

-------------· --- -------------- --------·----- ----

-----------

~- -

Entertainment was the one that we found more extensively continuing
-------------- .----- -- -- ---- ---- ... -........... - -- --- -- . --- to occur, where the title insurer would take the real estate brokers

-out to a lavish dinner, or take the whole office out to dinner and
~ ---------------------------· --- ----------~--·--·-------- -------------·------------- -- cocktails and that kind of thing. And this was the principal
------------ ------- --------'""'·-------·-·....... -·- -·---- --------- ------ ··-------violation that we foundo Although, we did find some other specific
- - - - ----·--·--··---·-·····-· --· ····---· .. -·- ··-······· - -- ...... ------- . - -violations that were of a more corrosive nature that tended to be
--~

actual dollars passing under the table to the people who direct the
title insurance or escrow.

The rebate bulletin also applies to
------·--•··--• ••·-•·---- - - - ~--·-·-•••r- ••--• ··--~

the escrow activities of title insurers.
-·----- ______ __ .--------·..
.,. _
..,., ......... ......
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: What is the evil of the rebate sit_,

---~-·~--

_,.......,

~

~

uation: how is the public contact?
parto

I'll say the entertainment

How is the public harmed?
MR. BAKER:

1

--~-

If

j;h_~:r;~were

ve;:y _<!irect competition in

------

· - - ~- .

·--··-

------

t~:_!'urchase c:>!_~~t-~_C: .!~~-u~':l~C::__it_~.oul_~n ~ ~ -~r~_babl~ m~~~e~..

But

Iw~~~- the __ J?.Ur~~~~~E_~-~ -~i~l~~~s~r~=~- _:~~ies ~n ~i:_ a~ en~ _:_? _~othe best possible job for him, and find the lowest possible cost,

·- -·.

~ ~ - t~~t ag~nt

directs

~~!le

insurance to someone because of favors

·that were done for the agent rather than for the benefits that are
---·-- ... -- ·--- -- - -· -- - . ·----- ---- ·- -- - -·
to - be
derived
by the
of title insurance, then we think
\
- - purchaser
- --. - - ~

\

~

~-

·- --~-

~pat

competition is
- -----·---··- --- ·----

~

diminished to the extent that it does existo

-------

-~-- -

ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

Is the industry competitive with

respect to price on equality of products?
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MR. BAKER:

The industry has not been competitive in a
'------~4-----···--

..

·~-------~- - --

·-·-· -·- -----·- -. - .. -·--.-

normal sense with respect to price in the past.

We see indications

right now that both price and quality of product are becoming a
focus of competition.

We have seen a substantial reform recently

by one title insurer.

We have seen some price movement.

There's

one dominant insurer who recently attempted to increase the rate
and the others didn't follow and it had to cut it backo

I

U~1:_ll_j:.JJ,,i. s

ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:
really didn't make

a ~x__?i _f~erence

.

I

J

rece_nt

develop~=!:.~!-_!~

where the real estate
..

.

-· .

age~t

_9et the $ame quality product: he is going to pay the same price.
MR. BAKER:

Yes, the absence of competition on a price

basis was probably, in part, because of the way the industry did
compete.

I think it's always competed in it one way or another.

But industry
for him.

- -- -··

_ g:!-_g _ ~_ompe~-~ -

'l'ha't_ is

?Y. _focusing on the agent and doing fav:?rs

_:t.he___way_.the.y_ got ..business- -so

-t he - pri~~

-~~~~'

t

Well, if they're stopped from focusing on the agent and
the favors that they can do him, it's our feeling that they will
try to find some other way to get business, because they are an
industry that does want to attract business.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Mr.

Baker, how would the industry

compete as to quality of services -- different types of coverage -more extensive coverage?
MR. BAKER:

Yes, that's one of the ways. More extensive
- ------------------------ -cover~-~·
The speed with which the service is perforrnedo The
- ----... experience in the title insurance business. To have a loss under
---------- - --------------~

title insurance is not something that anybody seeks: it's really
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something that is to be avoided, so the insurer that does the
quality job of searching title, will probably be used more than
one that does not.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

That, of course, is something that

you appreciate only if you ever sustained a loss or had a claim.
Like I've owned several houses and I've had title insurance, and
/

I I've never had a claim and I don't know what would happen if I do
have a claim, hopefully things will work out all righto•o
MR. BAKER:

The ordinary buyer probably never would
--· ·-·- - -~ . .. .

· ---· -- --- -~-

be exposed, except in a rare, rare instance to the quality of
service issue from a claim standpoint. It would be the lenders
• - - - w--·----·•-- -- · ----- - and the real estate brokers who would become more familiar with
••

this aspect of the quality of service .
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Is it very likely to be the typical

homeowner or his lender who is going to be confronted with this?
I was thinking it might be other types of property that would be
more subject to issues over title.
MR. BAKER:
title issues.

Rural

properti_~ s

often

!_le <?_~~~_;t!;> j ~~~~

I would say that, if we can characterize any partie-

ular class of property as being more or less subject to issues of

-

On the other hand, the dwelling prope;-!;_y .that ..haELphanged
.
-- - - - -.... - - - - .
. -- ---· ·- ..
hands a number of times and in an urban envirorun~
~!: J ~ __I_>_X:'?_e_~~ly
- ..... --.- ----.-

title.

----------------------------·--- _,____ -------

·· ·· ··

not
as, say, a ranch that
... __
_going
__ - - - - - to be as subject to -issues of title
-- -·-·'-

was last sold by the family under a
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Spanish Land Granto

I'll give you an example:

my

brother and I have a small interest in a farm back in southern
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Illinois and we don't have any idea how many people may have some
claim to that property.

The family has grown and gone on for

several generations and has scattered to the four winds and the
title to that thing is just hopeless.
We have a cousin who happens to be in the title business
back there and is now trying to piece it out, but I don't know if
it will ever be pieced out.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

Mr. Chairman, you've reached the

point where, and I've seen this from my own experience, one title
company will insure a title, and take a chance on a certain type
of title, let's say, where a more conservative company may not,
and the real estate brokers are anxious to make the sale, and so
you go with the title company that will take a chance.

And I

really don't see anything wrong with that, frankly, because some
of these old Portuguese families, for example, they have wills,
unprobated estates going back into the 19th century; there is no
way on earth that you can really tie that up into a nice little
package, somebody has to take a chance on it.

Because otherwise

nobody could ever own the property.
MR. BAKER:
title

~ns_~~-e~. !

i~

I agree with you on that, Mr. Knox.

The

he elects to take that chance, makes it known

to all of the parties exactly what the deficiences exist in the
title

ev~n

though _it may insure against them.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

Not in my experienceo

I mean he

either says if the title is vested in so-and-so -- of course, they
always put exceptions with respect to assessment bonds that may
be outstanding or unrecorded deeds of trust, or somethingo
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But

if he says there is a possible interest of unknown heirs, why you
------------ ----·--. ··-··-- ---------·----------

a_Jnarke~able

haven't got

.------

-

title and there's no way on earth that

-------

·-

--- --

doe~ __any,__@_C?~--a~-~-.E-~_5'0~~- will p~~----~or it.
MR. BAKER:

Well, if he will insure against it, even

though that's recognized, we see nothing wrong with that.

But for

the title insurer to recognize that there may be a deficiency of
title and not disclose that to the buyer, I don't think it is in
the best interest of the buyer, because regardless of the fact
that the title is insured, as I said, the difficulties that arise
when you can't deliver title to the next buyer -- good title to the
next buyer, or if the title is attacked during the tenure of your
ownership -- are very, very large for the owner of that property.
It's a real problem for him; he may have the title insured all
right, but there are many, many collateral considerations.

r

ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

You've got a covenant running with

the land, and you argue that this covenant has been abandoned by

!\

non-user, so the covenant running with the land no longer applies.
\
\ And not only that, but a quiet title decree. is obtained abQlishing

lr the

--------------~

.._..a __ _ _

covenant.

somebodyo

Well, the title insurer is taking a chance on that

---~~

appeal a hundred years later.

I conservative

It's a very slim chance, but some

companies won't insure and some will, and I don't

I

\

~~~e anything wrong with that.

MR. BAKER:

I don't see anything wrong with it either

for they do insure, but I think that at the same time if they
conduct the title search and find this, and don't disclose it to
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the buyer, as being a possibility of occurring, even though they're
insuring it, I think they're not doing their job for the buyero
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Larry, my understanding is they

are not required then to disclose anything that they find prior to
any issuance of title insuranceo
MR. BAKER:

Is that correct?

Well, we find, for example, title insurers

have had a tendency and some of them consider this as a service,
and there is some controversy surrounding it.

For example, to

insure title and cover mechanic's liens on a building where they
know that there are unpaid mechanics• debts, so
way tantamount to suretyship.

it'~

almost in a

They recognize, for example, under

a joint control situation, the lender has the money set aside to
pay these bills from the contractor, who is buildjng a building,
and this would typically take place on a new, large commercial
enterprise.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

And this could drastically affect

the future of the property owner and is how he uses his property.
MR. BAKER:
is, yeso

To answer your first question, the answer

This is done where they insured title and did not dis-

close to the purchaser that there are certain defects in the title,
or certain potential defects in the title that may occur.

They

will take the risk, as Assemblyman Knox has characterized it, and
we see nothing wrong with that, but we do think that they should
disclose it.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

But the question becomes one of

almost an ethical one, I guess, rather than one which would be
perfectly legal and proper.

Is that an appropriate term to use?
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They are doing what is legal and proper, but perhaps there might
be a question of ethically just exactly how far they should go or
what they should do.
MR. BAKER:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

And could it be possible to man-

date that by law?
MR. BAKER:

Yes, I think it would be.

ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:
on this?

May I ask Mr. Knox a question

What would your reaction be to that?
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

By saying by a law that you would

have to disclose any potential interests?
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

If they found this in their in-

vestigation, as to Mr. Baker's illustration, would you see anything particularly wrong with that?
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

Well, I don't just offhand.

I can

see where it's going to be a lot of trouble, with the real estate
·· industry because if you had a law, I don't know what the penalties
would be, but suppose you didn't write down each potential interest,
subsequent owners of the parcel may seek to enforce this covenant.
v

Well, I mean this is going to confuse a lot of people and may
worry a lot of lenders and I am not just sure how much it is in
the public interest.

You know that the insurance company, in my

opinion at least, isn't going to insure the title unless they are
awfully sure that it is O.K.

They may be willing to take a slight

risk, but a major risk, they presumably would not take because it
is in their interest not to have these claims because claims
certainly go far beyond the amount collected in premiums.
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I'm not

so sure that the company won't look at it but offhand, it doesn't
seem like a great idea to me.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Such a law, of course, would re-

quire certain judgmental decisions on the part of the title insurers because I assume we wouldn't want them to report that there
are frivolous possibilities; there would have to be a substantial
possibility.

Of course, this might in turn increase the cost of

title insurance.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Is it possible in your estimation,

Larry, to legally define this to eliminate frivolous disclosures?
MR. BAKER:

Well, in a sense, of course, it's what the

title insurance policy is all about.

A title insurance policy is

akin to an errors and omissions type of policy.

The title insurer

examines the title and then issues the policy that says that it
guarantees that its work is correct.

It seems to me when he examines

the title it would be our feeling that where there is any kind of
possibility that is a real one and not a frivolous one of attack
on the title, he has a duty to disclose that to the parties to the
transaction.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

MR:

BAKER:

It's not an exclusion •••

But how would you work that into some kind

of statutory scheme, I'm not too sure.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

They used to always point out the

old racial covenants that existed for many years.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Shelly v. Kramer (1948) outlawed

these covenants.
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ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

But for some years after that case

they still disclose these covenants.

They still vest the title but

they say subject to this covenant, or whatever the racial covenant
----------· ·-----------·--· --··---was. Well, now I don't think they bother to list them anymore.
But they used to, so you could argue thato

There potentially was

some kind of problem with regard to race or coloro
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Well, is there any law on this

now: any case law, statutory or regulation or any •••
MR. BAKER:

I couldn't tell you what the status of the

case law is if they fail to disclose something that they are aware
of and later subjects the title to some kind of attack.

------

-···· ·~-··--

... --. ~

-·-·-

I suspect

that the general rule would probably be that they would at least
waive whatever limits they have on their policy, in those circumstanceso
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

You think they would waive the

limits on their policy?
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

The policy is a contract, Mr.

Chairman, it would be a fraudulent contract in that sense, are
you indicating?
MR. BAKER:

I suppose the issue of good faith would

be raised.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Like an insurance company in an

auto case not conveying offers to their clients that they should
have conveyed and not settling in good faith and then being held
liable for above the policy limits.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

Well, Mr. Chairman, I can see

your problem with what he was saying -- if provided it's spelled
- 59 -

out, what is insured and what exclusions there are, but calling
attention to specific things.

And that was what I was getting at

and how you define that particular

thing~

...

But I suppose that it

-r

could be done.

Your answer was "yes 11 you think it could be done

statutorily.
MR. BAKER:

I think it could be done statutorily in

the same sense that it's done for real estate brokers.

For example,

they have a positive duty to make full disclosure.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Well, there may be more to this

idea than meets the eye, at first.

If you have any other thoughts

or suggestions on this we'll be glad to have you share them with

MR. BAKER:

May I go on just very briefly, into title

insurance rating and give you just a recent history on that?
said, for a number of years the title insurance industry,

As I

r3~~~r

comfortabhr_,_
----·-·
--drifted along without a great deal of g,n.y . price. - ~.ompetition per se, and the title insurance industry's rate structure

- ·-

~-

- - ·-

-· -·-·-

- ~···

--

was something that was born in antiquity: nobody seems to be able
to tell us exactly how that structure was arrived at.

It simply

seems to be a mechanism by which the industry seeks to gain
sufficient revenues to cover their costs and provide for profit.
The rate scales increase the cost of title insurance with increases
in the amount of the transaction.

Now, at first blush, one could

say that doesn't make much sense because it doesn't take any more
in the way of cost to examine a title on a relatively low valued
transaction than it does on a relatively high valued transactiono
One must, of course, recognize that even though the loss ratios
-
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are quite low for title insurance, there are financial risks in
issuing the policies and they probably are entitled to more premium for a higher valued transaction where there is a greater
amount of insurancea

But whether or not that proportionately

follows with the price of the property is, I believe, an open
question and I don't think we or the title insurance industry have
the answer to that question at this point in time.

Now, for a

number of years, there was no rate law that applied to title insurance.

Two years ago, there was a move on the part of the fed-

eral government to bring title insurance costs within the scope of
regulatory authorities vested in certain agencies in federal

g~v

ernrnent and you are familiar with the reports of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, which we made available to the
committee that focused on these particular issues.

As a conse-

quence of those moves, the title insurance industry saw that there
was probably some question about whether or not their costs carne
within the protection of the Mccarren Act as it was intended by
Congress, since there was a virtual void of law relating directly,
at least, to rate regulation and as a consequence they proposed
initially a law which would have required our department's prior
approval of any rates before they could be put into effect.

It's

the so-called "prior approval rating law" where a filing would be
submitted with statistical justification as to cost and then the
department would examine it's filing and say, yes or no as to
whether or not the filing was approved and the title insurer could
~se

those rates.

Our reaction to that law was that our experience

under the open competition law, the McBride-Grunsky Law, has been
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that this is a more satisfactory method of regulating costs for
the insurance industry than one where we give specific approval
to rates, or where we promulgate rateso

In general, the McBride-

Grunsky Act has been very effective in the casualty/property
business, and the primary reliance is on competition in that law.
I would say that our general experience is that an open competition
law is more exacting in the demands that it makes on the insurers
than anything that the Legislature can legally structure that
would enable us to directly regulate rateso
very tough taskmaster.

Competition can be a

But we observed that there was very little

price
competition
per se within the title insurance industryo
- -· -

So

we felt that there were really three things that had to occur if
we could move to a competitive system.

One was that there must be

positive effort to discourage or to absolutely prohibit any kind
of collusion on the part of the title insurers in the establishment
of rates.

Second, the focus of competition must be taken off the

----

---

--

_ zgbate -- type -Of aG-t ivities and put more on to other types o_f
tivities; the quality and cost of title insurance.

-~c

And third, an

examination must be made of the whole environment that title insurance sits in as to the means and mechanism of competition.

In

that sense, we feel that there is a need to explore different
ways by which it's possible for the people who make the purchasing
decisions of title insurance to have an interest in, and focus
on the cost of that coverage.
of ways.

Now that could be done in a number

One of the ways, of course, in which it is done, is

that if one title insurer's rates are much higher than the others,
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the person who directs them -- that business, to the extent that
they must pass those costs on and to the extent that their experience in the market place is affected by it, will suffer a loss
of business, if they direct their business to people who charge
too much.

But there are other mechanisms which we are studying

and we are trying to come to focus on; the means by which title
insurers compete and make maximum usage of the competitive market
place.
Now, when the title insurance industry carne to us and
asked whether or not we would support this prior approval law, we
asked them to consider a McBride-Grunsky type of open competition
law and to experiment with that type of a regulatory approach for
a period of time to see if we could bring vigorous price competition to the title insurance market and to essentially regulate
through examination of what the title insurers actually do and by
looking at each individual title insurer rather than looking at
them through some kind of a prior approval on statistics.

I

mentioned before this structure of increasing cost of title insurance in relationship to the costs that they actually incur.
It's been observed in other studies.

For example, there was a

rather exhaustive study in Pennsylvania that when the average
value of a transaction of the real estate transactions that are
conducted in any given year changes or shifts to where there are
a number of high-valued transactions versus a low number of highvalued transactions, one year to the next, this has a very heavy
impact on the profits of the industryo

The inference would seem

to be that the industry derives most of its profits from the very
-
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high valued transactions.

This, in turn, so the title insurance

industry would have us believe, means that the high valued transactions are subsidizing the low valued transactions, and they may
have maintained this to us, represented to us.

our own observation

of this phenomena is that it's probably indicative that there isn't
much price competition and that you really don ' t have an open
market situation at the present time.

If you did have an open

market situation, then there would be more competition for the
high valued transactions and the price would go down.
At the same time, we're really not too inclined to
accept this idea that there is, in fact, a cost subsidy.

If this

were to be accepted on its face, then the implication would be
that no small title insurer could ever break into the market place
because when a small title insurance company comes into the market
place, it's forced to essentially deal in the re1atively modest
transactions.

They don't come in and get a $30 million dollar

building that's changing hands, if they only have a net worth of
$2 or $3 million.

So as a consequence, if one accepted the idea

that the small or low valued transaction were subsidized by a
high valued transaction, you'd say that this is really an anticompetitive type of price structure which freezes people out, and
we have observed that this is not, in fact, the case.

Small

title insurers are able to enter the market, and have been able
to enter the market.

They have difficulties naturally, but we

feel that they are able and have been able to get into the market
in California and have been able to make a profit.

-

~

-

Well, the overall conclusion that one would draw from
this, is that the title insurance industry can stand a lot of
honing.

Probably, its profits, from our observation over a long

'----- - - -

period of time -- which is probably really the only fair way to
measure this type of industry's profits because it's very cyclical
-- changes from year to year, but..it: _Y.C?~ .- +Q9'k at it over a long

......._____

period of tj.me, I don•t thi.nk.--¥O.ll.. ...C.9.Yld
draw th~L.C.-O.nclu~:j..on
- ...___________
- - .that
-- -...--- - - ~------

the profits are exhorbitant or that they are really even excessive
-------------- -·- - --- ·--·-~·-·-•-"'' _ _ _ _ 0

''

oo•..-ti•r•-•~•••-• ...-------~·~' • • • - • • - · - - - · 4"''••~ 0 - · ·

or that they are neces§,£~..rily higher than the industry averages,
- ---------------------------------···--- ----------- ----··-·
.
but
p rg]d,gbl.,y __.on~ . could ---observe
that while the profits may
-----I ----think
-··
--- ------------·--------------·------------ ------------------ ...
~

not be as high__~fi ... they__c;ould be, the operating methods could be
----------... ·-·-- - -------- -·-·-·- ·---------- ... --·-····- -·--·-- ·-"--------.
.._ ______________________________
improved
terrifically,- - and that this ~-~-- . C?!l~ .. 2~....!:h~- §f.f.e_c.ts.....o_f
competitiono It isn't always a result of not having competition
- --- that you have excessive profits; often times the results is that
you simply have a laxity of management which doesn't operate in
the most efficient way.

They get comfortable and fat and don't

really look for the improved methods that technology can bring .
Now I think that this is beginning to occur in the title insurance
industry.

It has been occurring over the past couple of years,

it's a slow start.

I think the industry has a long way to go.

It would be our recommendation, certainly, that the main focuses
of the regulatory environment and the legislative environment be
to enhance the competitive environment of title insurers.

So that

they are held to the fires of open market, the free competition
environment.

If there are any questions, I would be glad to try

to respond.
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CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Very good.

Are there any questions?

ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:

Yes, I have a feeling that the

cost of transferring property, real property between a willing
buyer and a willing seller is probably too much, perhaps exorbitant in california.

Let me state my posture.

I have two questions.

Next week my committee will be here on a Tuesday discussing the
Auditor General•s Report that some of the functions performed by
the Department of corporations could be performed by the Department
of Consumer Affairs or the Secretary or State or vice versa, because
they have to do with the same thing.
on that.

So we are taking testimony

Now this could apply equally well to your department, and

my question is:

Should matters applying to the same transaction,

such as real estate transactions, be regulated by the same unit of
government?
MR. BAKER:

I 1 d be glad to respond to that, Mr. Culleno

The same question exists in our mindo

we•ve observed certain sit-

uations for example, principally in the escrow field of where the
Department of Corporations regulates the independent escrow companies, the banking department regulates the banks who perform
many escrows, the savings and loan department regulates the savings
and loan, and they have escrows and we regulate title insurers and
they do escrows.

And we find differing postures among these dif-

ferent regulatory agencies, and often rather vigorously diverse
views on what ought to be allowed or what ought not to be allowed,
so I think there could be many arguments for regulating at least
certain aspects of the things that relate directly to a real estate
transaction in a single department.
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On the other hand, there are

some things that argue against that.

One of the things as it

relates to title insurance, at least, is that there is a need to
regulate for solvency .
insurers remain solvent.

It is very important, I think, that title
If you are going to regulate for solvency

you must do so with a regulatory agency that has some expertise
in that field:

for example, one could be inclined to say we ought

to put title insurance in the real estate department .
many arguments that would augur in favor of that .

There are

On the other

hand, I don't think the real estate department has any expertise
at all in looking in financial condition surveillance such as we
haveo

So there are different forces that go in that way, but it

is certainly something that is worthy of exploration, at least .
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:
from that.

My next question is quite separate

We touched upon rebates, calendars and gifts .

I think

it's apparent to everyone that if there is business entertainment
or rebate or gifts that the cost of·that will be paid by the
ultimate buyer/consumer.

Now, if there were no laws on this

matter, at the present time, do you think it would be appropriate
to outlaw business entertainment of retailers by manufacturers
throughout our state?
MR. PAYNE:
if I may.

Mr . Cullen, I would like to answer that,

I think you have a different situation here totally,

in that there is a law that •••
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:
MR. PAYNE:

••• no, no .

That's not fair.

If there's no law -- let me tell youo

think that as long as there is no competition, as long as the

-
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I

competition takes place at the point of the real estate agent or
the escrow, I don't think you are ever going to get price competition.

Because I don't think there is a necessity for price

competitiono
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:

What you are saying is that where

the manufacturer of sofas, chairs, toilet fixtures, is entertaining various retailers, there is nothing wrong with that.
MR. PAYNE:

Because they have price competition,

vicious price competition.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:

Another category where the State

of California approves the price is with liquor and milk, that's
all right.
MR. PAYNE:

I'm not even going to get into that.

ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:

Well, no, but it is fair trade.

If you are going to fix the price, if you want to fix the price,
you don't want anyone going around and providing cabinets or
shelveso

Now in this business, wrere there is no fixed price,

your stated justification is that because there is no competition,
all of the manufacturers are in a position to entertain lavishly
and load up on the consumer.
MRo PAYNE:

Absolutely.

ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:
MR. PAYNE:

Is that right?

That money is going to the real estate

agent and escrow company rather than the consumer.

There is not

a necessity at this point in time for price competition because
you obtain the business at the source.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:

We can probably do something about
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that .

Now Larry Baker brought up another pointo

I encountered an

experience in connection with a purchase of a condominium by a
person in my officeo

The seller had a loan commitment at a neat

low percentage, like 8~~ and the going market was 9~, so that this

0

is an inducement.

Well, then on the list of costs were all these

various things over here:

title insurance, escrow, and so forth .

And one interesting cost was this $16 for the disbursement of impound of funds.

Now I had never seen that before and I told this

staff person you should have inquired about thato

And they said

we are charging you because we•re paying your taxes and we•re do-

0

ing this and we•re doing the other thingo

Now we mentioned here

earlier this morning that they are also holding that money without
paying interest, to defray such handling of costs.

0

In any event,

the point was made by the seller, you don•t have to buy from us,
we have a waiting list .

If you don•t like our 8~~, you don•t like

our $16 charge, we don•t care, which kind of goes against my graino
We have a number of bills saying that various retailers may not
dictate the fire insurance company, or may not dictate the mortgage insurance company, but here obviously when you have a buyer/
seller arrangement, they are in a superior position, the sale has
been agreed upon, but then come the costs and it just leaves me
with an uneasy feeling.

But you•ve mentioned that you are em-

phasizing the rebate because you think that•s important, but are
you in a position or should the State Legislature also initiate
bulletins making practices such as I have described -- regulating
them or making them illegal and saying that you must give the
buyer the choice of his title insurance .
-
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You may not charge for

disbursing impounds unless you pay interest on the deposit of
those thingso

It's possible, but probably not for your department.

MR. PAYNE:
we get off this.

I would like to make one point here before

We talk about calendars and a free lunch.

that is not what we are after.
talking about sizeable rebateso

That doesn't concern us.

We are

_fq ~

We're talking abo.ut,

But

inst:ance,

title companies supplying a Cadillac to drive for the agent or

,. - .

.
s~pply ~n~ of~ ~~ ~_ fur~iture
·----- ·.. talk!~~

~~ey

can

and equipment for a realtor.

We are

about the realtors who are given free credit cards where
~~tertain

at

~heir

wish, themselves or any friends at

restaurants. We're t_~lking about trips _~o exotic places. These
--- ----- ---· are meaningful cost items which are being paid, and those are the
things we're after.
or a $7 . 50 lunch.

The industry kind of hung us up on a $5 lunch
That•s not really what we're after .

after that big money, and it was there.
were

--

That was the way they

~ ~mpeting.

It is a very difficult thing and we have tried to

create rules by which they wish to playa
We said,

11

That's the whole thrust.

Look, how should we be regulated? 11

built 31 points of things that were
11

We are

11

We got together and

no-no's" and then we said,

0 . K., this is the way you are going to play the game 11 •

And then

they were terribly horrified when we issued subpoenas and this
information turned up about the rebates that had

continued~

my statutory responsibility is to enforce that regulation.
until you people change it, we have no alternative.

and
So

I think the

bulletin has done the job because I think it got the attention of
the boards of directors of the title companies and I think it's
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our fault this time that we are idiots for creating such a thing,
but next time it will be the fault of the executive officer of
that title company.
MR. BAKER:

I think, if I might add just one comment

here, to focus on your point that there seems to be a number of
different costs that emerge out of a real estate transaction which
often come as a surprise to the purchaser after he has made the
decision to buy a particular piece of property.

He is more or

less half way down the transaction and when he looks at a pretty
substantial real estate transaction, $30, $40, or $50 thousand,
a $16 cost doesn't mean anything to him, but when he looks at the
aggregate of it, and he gets a bill for a couple of thousand
dollars for all of the closing items then it does add up.

I

think that there are two things that are important that distinguish
this from a typical manufacturer/retailer kind of transaction.
One is, that in a manufacturer/retailer situation, you are not
dealing with a situation where the retailer has a fiduciary duty
to the purchaser, whereas, I think in a real estate transaction,
that the real estate broker does have a fiduciary duty to his
principal a
By the same token, the escrow holder has a fiduciary
duty to his principals .

Certainly the concept of full disclosure

before the transaction, before the purchaser of real estate gets
so far into the transaction that he can hardly turn around and
back out, this concept should be promoted so the $16 doesn't come
as a surprise.

Also •• •
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ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:
the same thing at all.

Larry, you're not talking about

Because the fiduciary relationship is

between the seller, and the consumer walks in and signs the document and then he starts this escrow procedure.

There's no one,

I don't believe, with whom he stands in a ficuciary relationship.
MR. BAKER:

Unless he has a real estate broker assist-

ing him in the purchase of the •••
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:

Which may be unlikely in these

condominium sales.

l

CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

It is my understanding that real

estate brokers take the position that they in many cases are agents
for both sides.
MR. BAKER:
when they ?tGt,.. foJ;"

T~~Y-..~E~--~~-~~C:i~~X- agents fo:J;" bq:t_h _ ~ ;i..d es

~~~Il!P~_e_,

.. ~s

~~crow

agents.

The other thing that

I think should be examined is trying to find as many ways as
possible to limit the number of separate chargeable items that
can be charged.

It seems to me that, for example, when you pay

an escrow fee for handling an escrow that to charge separately for
disbursement of some kind of funds or for holding some kind of
other funds -- many of the kinds of things should not be added on
as an additional amount.

I think the same kind of thing perhaps

applies with the lenders and with the title insurerso

There have

been some suggestions made which we've looked at as to how to do
this in title insurance, but we haven't formed any real conclusions
on them one way or anothero
For example, a suggestion has been made to make the
-

"'!... ~

...
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lender pay for

that_'..!_l

c~~~-~-_.cq_ro.p_~tit_ign.

That's Senator Proxrnire•s suggestion.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:
very much.

Any other questions?

Thank you

I believe our next witness is Mr. David G. Jackson.

Mr. Jackson is an attorney and you were counsel in Garrett v.

Coast Federal case, I understand.

And that case had to do with

what is a permissible late charge.
MRo DAVID G. JACKSON:
meno

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentle-

I will address myself solely to this business of late charges.

For four years I have been working on this one thing to the exclusion of about 80 percent of my practice.
in the City of Arcadia.

I am a sole practitioner

At the present time I am the attorney for

the plaintiff in nine other similar class actions regarding the
refund of late charges.
The problem is very simple.

We have a code section

1670 of the Civil Code of the State of california which bans
contractual penalities.

Now this is not a code section that was

adopted by our forebearers in 1870o

Contractual penalties were

banned in England 400 years ago, and I cited to the california
Supreme Court the case of the case of Peach vso the Duke of
Sommerset, back in 1636, that disproved of charging penalities to
coerce performance.

I have read this committee's report back in

1969, and I might quote from that report.
late fee is to insure prompt payment."
That, sir, is a coercive languageo
Court is my baby.

"The purpose of the

To insure prompt payment.

Now the California Supreme

I have been honored by law review people all

over the United States; I have been honored by the law book
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publishers with the words,
nave...

"This is a landmark case you have there,

And I feel it is.
The california Supreme Court said, "Well, we've been

approving of these things for 80 years now, as far back as 1894,
but we guess it's wrong".
i t is wrong".

The California Supreme Court said, "Yes,

We're going to have to come up with something better.

Now, they've got a problem.

I assume I do not know those gentle-

men personally, but I assume that this decision was something that
was hammered out as a bit of a compromise.

Because you have another

code section in California law, section 3302 of the Civil Code,
which says that the only measure of damages for failure to pay
money is interest.

I argued this point to Donald R. Wright.

questioned me on it very specifically.

He

I said these people owe a

total refund of all these penalties that they collected.

The Chief

Justice and the rest of the Judges in their infinite wisdom said,
"No, section 3302 does not apply"o

They never mentioned it in the

Garrett case, but they, in effect said it does not apply
savings and loan industry is entitled to a set-offo
equal to their actual damages for a late chargeo

A set-off

The damages

reasonably related to the collection of a late charge.
is where it is at today.
are pending right now.

The use of that grammar.

the

Now, this

These cases

I have seven of the best law firms ir

~he

State of California here in the Los Angeles Superior Court accusing me of selling out to Horne Savings and Loan because I worked
out a settlement with Horne Savings and Loano

Not Coast Federal.

Probably the biggest settlement, so their attorneys tell me; the
biggest refund ever offered to a class by a savings and loan in
-
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california.

At the present time the value of this settlement is

roughly $1,400,000.

The terms of the settlement provide for:

a

refund of 20 percent of all the late charges collected, a reduction
of the late charge from a figure equal to one-sixth of one percent
of the payors balance to 10 percent of the payors payment.

The

law firms in San Francisco, in Alameda County, San Mateo County,
say I have sold out; say that the 10 percent figure is unrealistic.
I don't think they want to quibble with me so much about the
million dollar cash refund to the members of the class.

It is the

amount of the monthly late charges that they are quibbling with.
And gentlemen, I agree with them to a degree.
realistic.

I think it is un-

I am a practicing lawyer trying to settle a law suit

for 20,000 peopleo

Now, Mr. Deddeh had a bill, I understand it

died in committee, a joint committee, hearing on the last day of
the last session of the last legislative meeting, and that bill
provided for 10 percent late charge.

There were amendments to

that bill for four and six percent late charges of the payment,
and I question what's fairo
A man has a $200 a month house payment.

Is it fair

to say that this $20 late charge is fair. is that reasonable?
Four years ago I would have said this is outrageous.

There is

no rational relationship between the $20 and the damage done to
the savings and loan institution.

Today I am not so sureo

The

savings and loan industry, and I don't want to ever have anybody
accuse me of sounding like a parrot for them, but nevertheless,
the fact is they are not banks.

They do not handle auto contracts
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or house trailer contracts, refrigerators, or what have you, they
handle home purchases, and that's all they handle.

Some of them

now do handle house trailer contracts.

But their measure of

damages is not that easy to determineo

There's one obvious measure

of damage.

A man has for example a 10 percent loan and his house

payment is $200 and he is 30 days late, then they are obviously
damaged one-twelfth of 10 percent of $200.
whatever.

A buck and a half, or

That's an obvious measure of damages.
Now I have done discovery with some of the smaller

savings and loans, and I have made some settlements with them.
Some of the smaller saving and loans have not given me the degree
of difficulty that the larger ones have.
figures have popped upo

And some fascinating

They seem to have a constant:

a), One out of six people pays three late charges a yearo

It

seems to be a constant.
b)

The amount of cost to the savings and loans to process

in the light of the Garrett decision amounts to anywhere from 5o6
percent of the payment to 15 percent of the paymento
interesting figure.

I'm well aware of the fact.

the hill in Washington.

A very

My boy works on

He was the first one to call and tell me

that the State of New York passed a two percent of the payment
late charge bill.

He was dumbfounded.

Two percent barely covers

the loss of interest to the savings and loan.
In the Garrett case, they came out with a paragraph
I wish they had never included.

When I read it I was sick.

"We

do not hold herein, that merely because the late charge provision

-
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is void and thus cannot be used in determining the lenders' damages,
the borrower escapes unscathed.

He remains liable for the actual

damages resulting from his default .

The lenders• charges could be

fairly measured by the period of time the money was wrongfully
withheld plus the administrative costs reasonably related to
collecting and accounting for a late paym.ento

11

Well, I have spent a year and a half reading that
paragraph over at 3 a.m. in my sleepo

What does it mean?

If you

get together the best accountants in America and you ask them
"what items are reasonably related to collecting a late charge? 11 ,
the accountants will say to you, "Sir, according to accepted
accounting procedures .. -- according to accepted accounting
cedures11 you must consider these items.

11

pro-

Then we get into the

question of what percentage of the President's salary, his Cadillac,
the retirment fund, the coffee fund, and everything else should
be attributable to the collection of · late chargeso

Frankly, from

my further discovery of the cooperative savings and loans, I
don't think they know .
with one suggestiono

Now, I'm going to cut it off right now
It's a very simple suggestion and you,

gentlemen, have the power to implement ito

I don't!.

For me, as

a one man practitioner, to demand a discovery necessary to get
this answer, there is no way I can do ito
the power.

You, gentlemen, have

You can simply say that the industry has to prove to

us what its late charges are; prove to us what it costs .
men have the power to do this, I don't.
be very frank.

You

I've run out of gas, to

I have a rough idea of what is in store for the

members of the class of people that I represent in nine different
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class actions.

There is no way that I can make that determination

within a five year period.

Of course, we have a five year dis-

missal period in this State.
impossible.

There's no way I can do it; it's

You, gentlemen, can say, we have decided in our in-

finite wisdom that 6% of the payment is fairo
to us differently, come forward and do ito

If you can prove

I have nothing furthero

Any questions, I will be happy to answero
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:
very much, Mr. Jacksono

Any questions?

Well, thank you

Do I understand that you are in the

process of settling the Garrett case, then?
MR. JACKSON:
the Garrett case.
that.

No, I am not in the process of settling

There is something further that I might add on

The defendant has put forward the proposition which I

believe is absolutely unwarranted.

You, gentlemen, of the State

Legislature, they argue, and the Supreme court of the State of
California have absolutely no business whatsoever telling them what
late charge they can charge, because since they are a fede=al
agency chartered by the Congress of the United States, the State
of california has been preempted.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Did they raise this defense in the

original action?
MR. JACKSON:

They have raised that defense and it is

now pending before Judge Matt Burns in the Federal Court here in
Los Angeleso

But I believe it's a specious defense and it will

be shot down eventually.
here's the problemo

But in the meantime the years go by and

Here is the problem with these class actions.

-
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Statistically, one out of 60 will sell their home this
year.

Now, if these people sell their homes, they may be members

of the class with a refund coming, but they're gone.
find them; we'll never be able to give them a refund.

We'll never
So the

longer they can stall these cases, the more difficult it becomes
to ever find the member of the class to give them a refund.

Any-

thing further, gentlemen?
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

I think not.

Thank you very

much for coming in.
Perhaps this might be an appropriate time for you •••
MR. BOB DeKRUIF:

I'm Bob DeKruif representing H. F.

Ahmanson & Company, and I'm not a technician, as most of you know,
but I thought for the consideration of the Committee in reference
to a couple of statements that have been previously made, which
were true statements as far as they go.

But I think that knowing

you as the Committee; knowing that Mr. Steve Baker is interested
in consumer affairs, that something of interest on these late payment charges would be of interest to the Committee and to Mr.
Baker.

They're both interested in consumers; you, as the Com-

mittee are interested in consumers; you, as the committee are

Mr. Baker mentioned this morning that

interested in constituents.

the late charge for FHA, I believe, and VA would be 4%, and other
statements have been made that the State of New York has come
through with 2%.
I think something that the Committee should take under
consideration -- that these are the records I just got five minutes
ago bringing it current -- that on our conventional loans where
-

79 -

\

we, as Mr. Jackson has mentioned, charge 10%.

Our conventional

loan delinquency ratio, which I think you should be interested in
from the consumer-constituent standpoint, is .583 on 30 to 59
days.

On our FHA loans, it's 8.832; on our VA loans, it's 5.973,

which is just comparing the conventional, and the VA is ten times
as much, ten times the percentage amount.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Those are the people who are

delinquent 30 to 59 days?

MR. DeKRUIFF:

Thirty to 59 days, and 60 to 89 days

runs about the same pattern and 90 and over, and the total relates
perfectly again as it averages out on the conventional loan, it's
.827 or o877, I can't read the writing hereo
8.127 and on the FHA, it's 11.455.

On the VA, it's

For the benefit of the Corn-

mittee and the Department of Consumer Affairs, I don't know whether
you want your consumers and constituents in this state of affairs,
or not.

Thank youo
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

All right.

Thank you very much.

Mr. McCarthy, do you want to come forth and make some comments?
MR. McCARTHY:

statement.

Well, Mr. Chairman, I have no prepared

Obviously, we weren't aware the testimonies were to

be given by the Commissioner.

We have, however, reserved some

time for the November 22 hearing of this Committee for purposes
of rebuttal.

I can mention two things, one with respect to the

mechanic's lien coverage and the knowledge of defects in title
and the failure to report them.

I think there is evidence of

complete misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Baker of the effect
of doing just those things.

If you do, in fact, know of a defect
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of title that is of record and you don't show it, you just bought
it under your policy.

There is absolutely no incentive on the

part of a title insurer, who knows of a defect in title, not to
show that, unless he intends to pay the cost of perfecting title.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Mr. McCarthy, I presume something

like a mechanic's lien.o.
MR. McCARTHY:

Well, I was going to get into a

mechanic's lien.o.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:
you were talking abouta

Well, I thought that was what

Well, I think he bought it, and in other

words, he would have to pay it off.
MR. McCARTHY:

Right?

That's right.

CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Now, of course, I can see that.

On the other hand, there are some other defects in title that are
not quite that simple.

Aren't there?

MR. McCARTHY:

Well, in the mechanic's lien there isa

This is probably the most difficult area of law dealing with real
property that the insurers have to be confronted with.

The simple

fact is, on any new construction, there's always the potential of
a mechanic's lien; but the point of this is, that the priority of
that mechanic's lien is on the date that construction commenced.
You have a two-year construction project and a mechanic, a laborer
is not paid on the sixth month of year two, the priority of that
lien is not at the time he's not paid, but it refers back to the
date that the job commenced.

So, if you insured certain funds

that were forwarded in the year one, the potential priority of
that mechanic's lien a year and a half later, is a year in advance
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of the lien of the first Deed of Trust, or whatever insurance has
been given.

So, this is always present, we protect as best pos-

sible to make sure the payment is madeo.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Well, I understand there are

complexities in the law of mechanic's liens.

However, as you

indicated, you can at least get rid of that problem, if worse
comes to worse by buying a mechanic's lien.

I think Mr. Baker

was talking more about other types of potential title defects which
might make it, in fact, impossible to give good title, and while
money might pay you off in a sense, yet maybe you might rather
have the land than the money.

You can get the land by taking a

mechanic's lien, but you might not be able to get the land in the
face of some other defects.
MR. McCARTHY:

I'm not familiar with the defects that

he had in mind, but the service that we provide is to secure
title and possession of real property, and not something other
than that.
On the area of rate regulation that Mro Baker indicated
that we participated in the drafting of the new regulation law for
the State of

California~

however, he indicated that there is a

new law that went into effect pursuant to the wishes of the Department of Insurance.

This is a McBride-Grunsky form of insurance,

giving the Insurance Commissioner full power to regulate the rates
of title insurance in this State.
There was a reference to rebates.

I believe the im-

pression was created that this is a practice that is going on
today in california.

The position of the industry is that although
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there possibly may have been some abuses in the past, that is not
the case today .

In the event of these fines that were levied, it

is my understanding that the department•s subpoena expense record
multiplied that amount by five percent, levied a fine, and then
in turn told the insurer to justify to us the fact that these were
not entertainment expenses in violation of Bulletin 74-2.

There•s

no permanent finding in any of these cases that we are aware of,
of the types of

11

lavish activities 11 o

These would be, as the

commissioner indicated, events which had taken place in the past,
but we will have more specific responses to those before the Committee at a later time.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Any questions?

O.K. Thank you.

Mr. DeKruif, it just occurred to me that there are
just one or two things I would like to ask you to clarify.

I

take it from your testimony that you are saying that the substantial
late charge, in effect, discourages people from making late payments?

And that would be the thrust of these respective percentage

figures from FHA and conventional loans, etc.
MR. DeKRUIF:
you used,

11

Yes, I would like to correct one word

substantial 11 •
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Well, at least more substantial

than whatever -- I mean that would be a difference in degreeo
leads me to my next question.

Mro DeKRUIF:

That

What is an appropriate late penalty?

I prefaced my remarks that I am not a

technician and a lot of this will come out in Mr. McKenna, and

Mr. Pratt•s testimony tomorrow, but I, again, am speaking from a
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practical standpoint of knowing the reaction you get from consumers and constituents.

If I heard Mr. Jackson say that for the

benefit of the class, that he settled with us, I do not know the
details of the case.

I just tried to find them out by telephone

on the basis of 10%.

If after all his study and work, if I under-

stood him correctly, then I would accept that, and that is what we
accepted in Mro Deddeh's bill.

We supported that all the way

through and have the year before, and Assemblyman Pearson's bill,
I think, was the same bill.

We've always supported that position.

CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Of course, Mro Jackson may have

settled this case or perhaps this case will be settled, and yet
the basic thrust of the Garrett case is going to have to be dealt
with in some manner; that is, it says that a late fee must be
reasonable, must be related to the cost of processing and the
actual loss, and whether that is actually decided in this case, or
not, it's going to . be decided somewhere along the way, either by
further cases or by the Legislature.
MR. DeKRUIF:

Now, I'm assuming, and I shouldn't

assume that he must have put in an awful lot of work and an awful
if he was doing it for the

lot of study to arrive that was

benefit of all the people that he was doing it for, he must have
done this and thinking it was fair.

I'm sure he wouldn't settle

on that basis, and I'm sure, assuming too, that he had some costfactors that went into that, that proved that that was a legitimate
deal.

I just assume •••
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

mony

I rather deduced from his testi-

that he was somewhat frustrated trying to figure out what
-
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it was.
MR. DeKRUIF:

Well, again, I tried to get the benefit

of what went into our arrangement, which I understand is now still
pending for court approval, I think in December it has to be approved so we must have satisfied the accounting standards that
it was a justifiable charge.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

OaK., now at this time we will

be glad to hear testimony from anyone else who wishes to testify.
Mrsa Frances Meyer spoke with me briefly at the beginning of the
afternoon session and presented a letter to me with regard to prepayment penalties which is, of course, one of the major subjects
of the interim study to which we have not yet gotten today, but
we will be tomorrow, and the following day in San Diego.
We have ample time now, Mrsa Meyer, if you would like
to come forwarda

We will be discussing it tomorrow, but that's

fine, you come right up.
MRS. FRANCES MEYER:

My name is Mrs. Frances Meyer

and I represent only me and I was only involved in this one real
estate transaction, but I had been advised by the realtor that
the Horne Savings would not waive any prepayment penalties which
was evidentally a practice in the industry that if any savings
and loan gets a new loan, they would waive the prepayment penalty.
They told me that they didn't have that practice, yet another
realtor told me that on several occasions Horne Savings had waived
the prepayment penalty in transactions they handledo

I had called

the Senior Vice President of their main office in Los Angeles, and
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he told me that if they all followed the same practice they would
be considered as engaging in collusion on this, and when I tried
to argue with him and told him that they evidentally weren't so
meticulous about being charged with collusion, if they all charged
the same interest rate on certificate accounts.
seem to make any differenceo

But that didn't

Anyway, I had to pay the prepayment

penalty which I thought was unfair in view of the fact that so
many others don't do it.

I didn't know whether there is a law in

the State that gave them the discretion to do it or not.
Also, this varies a little from the question of prepayment, but I again wondered why a real estate firm tried to use
such pressure in getting to use their escrow company in a real
estate transaction.

They don't explain to you that you have a

legal right to use any escrow company you wisho

I happened to

find this out quite by accident and found I saved myself almost
$100 by having it done somewhere else, rather than with the escrow
company.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Was it a real estate firm that

tried to get you to use •••
MRS. MEYER:

Their escrow company.

CHAIRMAN McALISTER:
MRS. MEYER:

O.K.

And I couldn't understand really why so

many of the real estate firms have their own escrow companies, I
know that they certainly must be licensed to, but a long time
ago I had a very brief course in commercial law and was told that
an escrow agent is usually one who acts as a disinterested third
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party in transactions and I frankly can't see how anyone who is
engaged in either the buying or helping you sell or helping you
buy a place can be absolutely objective and, you know, out of
the part of the transaction.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

When you tried to get the gentle-

man to waive your prepayment penalty, did he indicate any standards or measurements by which he was guided to determine who got
a waiver or who didn't?

Or did he just tell you he wasn't going

to waive yours?
MRS. MEYER:

He just said that they didn't do it

because they would be accused of cdlusion if they all followed
the same practice.

Yet, as I said, I found out from a second

real estate company, that on occasion, they had had this company
waive the prepayment for them, and so but nobody could find out
what standards they use for or againsto
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

How long have you owned your

home?
MRSo MEYER:

I had owned it a little over two years.

CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

And you paid about $278.50 pre-

payment chargeo
MRS. MEYER:

Yeso

CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

0

Thank you very much, Mrso Meyero

OoKo

Any questions?

All righto

If anyone else would like to

testify today representing any group or just yourself, please
feel free to let me know.

0

We will adjourn until 9:30 tomorrow morningo
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